

Forum: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Issue: The situation in Ethiopia


Student Officer: Ilias Romanos Sporidis

Position: Deputy President

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

On the first of June 2026 elections for the lower house of the Ethiopian legislature were held across the country. Except in Tigray, the northernmost region of Ethiopia. This was the culmination of decades of disputes, broken agreements, and even armed conflict. As a delegate in the Security Council, you have been called upon in order to work together and to take action. To create legally-binding resolutions and attempt to resolve the topic at hand with the common consent of all parties and end the tragic humanitarian crisis that has plagued the region.

The formation of the modern Ethiopian state came to be from the conquest of various neighboring civilizations in the 19th century. As such Ethiopia has always been a multicultural nation with more than 80 separate ethnicities. Though some are certainly considered more prominent culturally and politically, as we shall soon see. From the 138.8 million citizens of Ethiopia, around 35 percent are of Oromo descent, while the Amhara people are 24 percent of the population. Somalis, which are 7 percent of the population, are largely located in the east of the country, bordering Somalia and Tigrayans are just 6 percent of the total population and dominate the northernmost region of the country, bordering Eritrea. A sizable minority of Sidama people, 4 percent of the entire population can also be found south of Addis Ababa¹



¹ Alkazaz, Amr, and Mohamed Hussein. "A Visual Guide to Ethiopia's Ethnic Groups and Conflict Areas." Al Jazeera, 29 May 2026, www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/29/a-visual-guide-to-ethiopias-ethnic-groups-and-conflict-areas.

The political stability of Tigray and of the federation of Ethiopia was, in a large extent, compromised in 2020 with the outbreak of armed conflict between the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the national armed forces of Ethiopia. The conflict officially ended in 2022, but the instability rages on to this day. Continuous resistance from the TPLF against the federal Ethiopian government, the head of which is prime minister Abiy Ahmed, led the TPLF to reassert control over the regional government of Tigray and start operating independently from the government. It is in this context, that the upper house of the Ethiopian parliament, the House of Federation (HoF) removed electoral authority of the region of Tigray.

As delegates in the Security Council, you will have a unique opportunity to create resolutions and find solutions which will be implemented and are legally binding, as the Security Council was created in order to resolve any international conflicts and to ensure global stability and the maintenance of the international order. So one shouldn't be afraid to be bold. You can attempt to resolve the issue by any means in your disposal, by investing deep-rooted cultural and social disputes inside the two states, as well as the important role of politics and hunger over power that has contributed to the crisis which sets Ethiopian unity under great strain. Reactions from international superpowers, however, are to be expected. Negotiations and certain diplomatic retreats will be necessary to avoid the use of veto powers from members of the P5 and to find a common agreement over the procedures of resolving the topic at hand.

DEFINITION OF KEY-TERMS

Coup d'état ²

A sudden, illegal and often violent change of the government inside a country. The term is often used to describe that this change was orchestrated by a small military group.

Interim Regional Administration ³

The formation of the Interim regional Administration of Tigray was ordered by Article 10 of the Pretoria Agreement in accordance with the powers of the Federal Government of Ethiopia granted by Article 62 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and Article 14 of the System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions Proclamation No. 359/2003. Getachew Reda, a TPLF insider who was one of the main negotiators of the Pretoria

² "Coup D'état." *Cambridge Dictionary | English Dictionary, Translations & Thesaurus*, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/coup-d-etat?_cf_chl_rt_tk=eO2Qjf3Oba16Oe5MH98pi3OPHTYNYs0E.al0mutAUw-1783703368-1.0.1.1-mNeLP8kRnFbIRN6ORS2sUIEr1iL.JolMf.F2X19HrJ0.

³ Tronvoll, Kjetil, and Mehari T. Maru. "Tigray's precarious transition: On the establishment of an Interim Regional Administration." *DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA*, democracyin africa.org/tigrays-precarious-transition-on-the-establishment-of-an-interim-regional-administration/.

Agreement on behalf of the TPLF, was appointed president of the administration by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The Interim Administration was originally designated as a transitional measure until regional stability was secured and held supreme authority over the Tigray region, enforcing its power without a popular mandate. By early March 2025 the humanitarian situation in Tigray was already worsening and an internal power struggle inside the TPLF led to a coup by a group of generals opposed to Reda, de facto overturning the Interim Administration's authority and ending its mission, despite Ahmed's appointment of a new Administration president, attempting to maintain its legitimacy.

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) ⁴

Formally known as the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), or simply as the Pretoria Agreement, it was the Documents that ended the 2020-2022 conflict between the TPLF and ENDF. Among other provisions, it ordered the creation of the Interim Regional Administration in Tigray. Common criticism is that many of the provisions of the agreement were not properly implemented by the two parties, which partially led to the growing instability in Tigray in more recent years, culminating in the 2026 parliamentary elections in Ethiopia.

Ethnic Federalism⁵

Ethnic Federalism is an ideology focusing on the creation of a federal state in accordance with local ethnicities. Examples of ethnic federalism being implemented in a national framework can be seen in the Russian Federation and in Ethiopia. In the case of Ethiopia, the rights of individual ethnicities, including self- government and the formation of local institutions of government are clearly defined in the constitution of Ethiopia, adopted in 1994.

National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)^{6 7}

An institutional body created by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia Establishment

⁴ "Turning the Pretoria Deal into Lasting Peace in Ethiopia." *International Crisis Group*, 23 Nov. 2022, www.crisisgroup.org/stm/africa/ethiopia/turning-pretoria-deal-lasting-peace-ethiopia?utm=.

⁵c Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities." *Semantic Scholar* , www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Ethnic-Federalism-in-Ethiopia%3A-Challenges-and-Alemayehu/ec5a9050b0f3015aebd0444574593c005d07ced7. "Ethni

⁶ <https://nebe.org.et/election-laws>

⁷ Observer, Ethiopia. "Elections Will Not Be Held in 46 Constituencies Across the Amhara and Tigray Regions." *Ethiopia Observer*, 26 May 2026, www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2026/05/26/elections-will-not-be-held-in-46-constituencies-across-the-amhara-and-tigray-regions/.

Proclamation No. 1133/2019 with approval by the House of People's Representatives in 2019 and is responsible for overseeing and organizing Ethiopia's national elections. The NEBE played an important role in the worsening relations between the TPLF and federal government of Ethiopia that led to the Tigray war, but also in the recent instability, as NEBE also grants party license to political parties inside Ethiopia. Most recently, it played a role in carrying out the federal government's decision not to organize elections in many districts of the country, including in the entire region of Tigray.

Communism⁸

A political ideology advocating for the overturn of the capitalist economic system, the taking over of the means of production by the common worker, collectivization of those means of production by the government and then distribution of the resources produced by such means equally to the entire population of a country.

Separatism⁹

A political ideology striving for greater autonomy or outright independence by a common religious, ethnic, social or political community from a larger governing entity, because of cultural or political distinctions and disagreements with such an entity. Many separatist movements, south of the Mediterranean Sea, are backed by violent, often armed groups.

Federative State/ Federation¹⁰

A form of national governance in which the federative government has relatively weak authority over local individual federative units. A federative state is split in many local federative units, often in boundaries of specific ethnic groups. A federative form of national governance normally dictates that the federative government shall have relatively weak authority over the governance of local individual federative units.

⁸ "COMMUNISM Definition & Meaning." Meanings & Definitions of English Words | Dictionary.com, www.dictionary.com/browse/communism.

⁹ "Separatism." EBSCO, Cambridge Dictionary, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/separatism>

¹⁰ "federal state." Britannica, www.britannica.com/topic/federal-state.

The Dergue^{11 12}

Officially known as the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) it was the military dictatorship that ruled Ethiopia from 1974, after overthrowing the previous imperial government officially until 1987, though its members continued to govern the country until 1991. Various radical student uprisings between 1960 until 1974 culminated in the overthrow of emperor Haile Selassie the first and the Dergue gaining power in Ethiopia, which then proceeded to establish a communist system of governance in the country. Even though the Dergue was officially dismantled in 1987, following a national referendum to establish a civil administration, its members, of which was president Mengistu Haile Mariam, controlled Ethiopia's government until 1991.

Tigrayan People's Liberation Front

Originally created as a paramilitary organization, it has nowadays evolved also into a prominent political party inside Ethiopia. The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) is the successor to the Tigray National organization (TNO) and founded in 1975 with the purpose of continuous armed resistance against the centralization of power in Addis Ababa by the Dergue. The TPLF, in cooperation with other allies, overthrew the Dergue in 1991. The TPLF formed a coalition government composed of those allies, reorganized as political parties, and governed Ethiopia from 1991 until 2018, when the coalition collapsed. The TPLF refused to participate in the new government of Ethiopia, which was composed of most of the former political partners and instead ignored the rulings of the government in Addis Ababa inside the region of Tigray, in which the TPLF was the governing party of. This tension culminated in the begin of armed conflict between the TPLF and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in 2020 until 2022, with the signage of the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF was designated as a terrorist organization in 2021, but was removed from the list of designated terrorist organizations of the Ethiopian government in 2023. It was also subsequently banned as a national party in 2020 and regained that status in 2023 until 2025, when the National Election Board of Ethiopia revoked its party license.^{13 14}

¹¹ "Ethiopia - Derg, Famine, Revolution | Britannica." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 12 Apr. 2026, www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91.

¹² <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40864628>

¹³ Agencies, News. "Ethiopia to Designate TPLF, OLF-Shene As 'terror' Groups." *Al Jazeera*, 1 May 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/1/ethiopia-to-designate-tplf-olf-shene-as-terror-groups. Accessed 1 May 2021.

¹⁴ "Tigray." *Britannica*, www.britannica.com/place/Tigray-historical-region-Ethiopia#ref248314.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Ethiopian preceptive

Ancient Ethiopia

The history of the Ethiopian civilization is more than 2 million years old, with certain historians arguing that early humans arrived in modern- day Ethiopia 3 million years ago. Several notable kingdoms have risen and fallen in the region, influencing the area's geopolitics from antiquity. One of the first of such kingdoms was the kingdom of D'mt, which was founded in the Tigrayan plateau and eventually grew eastwards, obtaining the valuable resources of the region. The power of the kingdom was significantly reduced, as new trade routes were founded and eventually the Aksumite empire was created, also with routes to the Tigrayan region. After a series of monarchical dynasties, foreign pressure and internal social unrest led to the collapse of the Solomonic dynasty in 1796.

The first modern Ethiopian state

After the period known as "Age of Princes" (1769–1855), Kassa Hailu, a merchant who organized his own military force, was crowned emperor Tewodros II of, what historians consider to be, the first modern Ethiopian state. Tewodros II pushed for an agenda of centralization of power in the national capital of Dabra Tabor. Something that proved extremely unpopular with local princes, many of whom turned on open rebellion against the emperor, including those of Tigray. Tigray even conspired against Tewodros II and let British forces pass through Tigray into Ethiopia after diplomatic tensions between the two parties had led to war. The British were successful in capturing large parts of Ethiopia and in 1868 Tewodros II committed suicide instead of surrendering to British forces. In response to growing Italian colonial ambitions in the Horn of Africa, in 1889 the then Ethiopian emperor, Menilek II signed the treaty of Wuchale, which granted Italian ownership of modern- day Eritrea and minor parts of Tigray. Though, because of a misunderstanding in the treaty, partially due to differences in translations, the Italian government argued that the Eritrean imperial government was to conduct foreign affairs exclusively through the Italian foreign ministry, effectively making Ethiopia an Italian protectorate. Emperor Menilek II did not agree to this interpretation of the treaty and denounced the entire agreement in 1894, sparking armed conflict between the two parties. The Ethiopians, led by Menilek II, defeated the Italian forces in the battle of Adwa, which is credited as the first major decisive victory of an African army against a European colonial power, which secured Ethiopia's independence and position as a formidable force in Africa against any foreign oppression.¹⁵

¹⁵ "Treaty of Wichale." *Britannica*, www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Wichale.

In 1930, the noble Ras Tafari declared himself emperor as Haile Selassie I. He immediately began implementing many modernizing reforms to Ethiopia's institutions as well as public infrastructure, but also centralized more power in the imperial throne, like his predecessors. The Italian government, under Duce Benito Mussolini, feared that the rapidly modernizing Ethiopia might become a resistance to growing Italian ambition over the Horn of Africa, as they already had secured governance over Eritrea and Somalia. Italy invaded and occupied Ethiopia in 1936, conjoining it with Eritrean and Italian Somalia to the administrative colony of Italian East Africa.

Post- War Ethiopia and the overthrow of the imperial monarchy

After the liberation of East Africa from Italy by Allied forces in 1941, emperor Haile Selassie I returned to the Ethiopian throne and formed a new national government, which continued expanding the consolidation of power in Addis Ababa. Amid concerns over social injustice and political disagreements, the peasants in Tigray revolted in 1943, directly against the Ethiopian imperial crown. Ethiopia did not yet possess the proper institutional, as well as organizational framework to respond to such revolt, having been liberated from fascist oppression just two years ago. As such, emperor Haile Selassie I asked for the British Royal Air Force (RAF) divisions stationed in the region to intervene militarily and crush the revolt. So did they do and the security and stability for the imperial crown of Ethiopia was secured for the following years. After a previous meeting with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945 and later negotiations, Ethiopia formed a federation with the region of Eritrea in 1952, giving the Empire access to the ports bordering the Red sea for the first time in decades. The federation was disbanded in 1962 by the imperial government and Eritrea was from then treated as any other province inside the Ethiopian empire.

In December of 1960, the college students at the University of Addis Ababa became the only group to publicly express their support of the coup against emperor Haile Selassie I that took place the same month. Amid social concerns over the feudal hierarchical system promoted by the crown, student uprising following left- wing ideologies, which opposed the imperial status quo began across Ethiopia and lasted until 1974. The student uprisings undisputedly constituted the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974 by the Dergue. ¹⁶

The Dergue and the Ethiopian civil war

¹⁶ <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43660011>

The Dergue started establishing a new system of national governance, borrowed from socialist and marxists principals and immediately started to consolidate power in the capital of Addis Ababa, following the same policy directions by the Soviet Union. This came into great opposition with the various distinct ethnic communities of Ethiopia, particularly the one of the Tigrayans, who, under the guidance of the newly established TPLF, began a campaign of guerilla warfare against the military dictatorship of the Dergue, starting what was later named the Ethiopian civil war. In 1977 lieutenant colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam managed to become the chairman of the Dergue again and subsequently the head of state of Ethiopia. In 1983 failed agricultural reforms by Mariam and continuous droughts culminated in the beginning of a disastrous and tragic famine in Ethiopia which mainly affected northern regions, such as Tigray and Eritrea and claimed the lives of more than 300 thousand people. The Dergue's response was unorganized and by some measures worsened the humanitarian crisis by not allowing foreign aid to come to the country until late 1985. Finally, in 1991 the military coalition of the Ethiopian People's Revolution Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which the TPLF was the de facto leader of, overthrew the dictatorial government and president Mariam fled to Zimbabwe.

A new Ethiopia

The military EPRDF coalition evolved into a political alliance after the overturn of the Dergue and the leader of the TPLF, Meles Zenawi, took over the presidency and formed a transitional government with the goal of signing a new constitution for Ethiopia. In 1993, following a UN- backed referendum, which was approved unilaterally among the Eritrean population, Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia. In 1994 a new constitution was adopted, formalizing the new 9 federative districts, which were established following ethnic and linguistic lines, creating a parliamentary form of government, within a new system of federal governance, granting the office if the prime minister supreme executive power instead of the presidency and established a bicameral legislature, among other reforms. Once this constitution came into effect in 1995, Meles Zenawi became the first prime minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. This new federal system of governance finally satisfied the demands for autonomy for the many nationalities of Ethiopia, at least on paper. Under this new status quo, elections would always come in favor of the TPLF, as most of the other political parties comprised the political coalition with the TPLF, the EPRDF. The federal system established by the 1994-1995 constitution of Ethiopia found itself contrary to the principle ideology of marxist- leninism of the TPLF. In practice, the EPRDF enforced an often authoritarian style of governance, partially, since all federal and local political offices were dominated by the coalition. This de- facto unitary system of centralizing political power to the capital and more importantly, the governing party, faced fierce backlash from certain ethnicities and political groups inside of Ethiopia. After territorial disputes with Eritrea, among other disagreements, in 1998 the two states were drawn into war with each other, called the Badme

;

war. Although the war officially ended in 2000, armed border conflicts continued until 2018, something that put the TPLF officially at odds with Eritrea.

The collapse of the EPRDF and the rise of Dr. Abiy Ahmed

Zanawi passed away in 2012 and the chairmanship of the TPLF and premiership of the country went to Hailemariam Desalegn. In 2015 general elections for the lower house of the Ethiopian legislature were held across Ethiopia. Widespread fraud and intimidation of the opposition was noted in polling stations. When the results were announced, the EPRDF and its other allies won every single seat in the House of Peoples' Representatives, something, which proved the increasingly authoritarian system of governance that was evolving in Ethiopia under the EPRDF. Continued pro-democracy protests and unrest after the elections led to the resignation of Desalegn from the premiership and the EPRDF quickly elected the already party insider Dr. Abiy Ahmed to the position of prime minister. Soon, many of the parties of the EPRDF conjoined to form the new Prosperity Party (PP) of prime minister Ahmed. Notably, the TPLF refused to join the organization and entered opposition. In their regional governance of Tigray, the TPLF often ignored the decisions of the federal government and focused a policy direction independent of the government which was attempting to consolidate power inside Ethiopia. Abiy Ahmed, which took power in the promise of peace, resolved the border conflict with Eritrea in 2018, further angering the Tigrayans.

Rising tension and the modern status quo

In 2020, the federal government postponed regional election in Tigray, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, as the official reasoning. The TPLF accused of postponing the elections for political reasons and organized the regional elections anyway, which they won. In response, Ahmed cut federal funding to Tigray, which prompted the TPLF to capture a federal military base. As a reaction, Abiy Ahmed deployed federal armed forces in Tigray, which started the Tigrayan war between the two groups. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces were assisted by the Eritrean Defense Forces, which were now aligned with Ethiopia and who invaded Tigray from their northern border. The national elections for the House of Peoples' Representatives in 2020 were also postponed until 2021 and the region of Tigray was excluded from participation. In 2022, after the ENDF and EDF captured large parts of Tigray, the Pretoria Agreement formally ended the conflict between the two parties and established an interim regional government in Tigray. After the TPLF retook power in Tigray in 2025, the response of the federal government was to once again, prohibit the entire region of Tigray to participate in the national elections for the House of Peoples' Representatives, after the NEBE revoked the TPLF's party license which has sparked new concerns of a looming new civil war in Ethiopia, which brings us to the current state of affairs.

The Tigrayan preceptive

Ancient Tigray and its place in the modern Ethiopian state

The region of Tigray has always been an important cultural and historical center of Ethiopian civilization. It was the birthplace of the ancient Kingdom of D'mt and later the center of the Aksumite empire. Its influence declined in the 16th century, though, with the loss of its coastal access by the Ottoman empire. The first notable resistance against central governance by the Tigrayan people was noted around the late 13th century A.C., when Tigrayan elites disputed the direct connection of the Zagwe dynasty with the union of king Solomon of Israel and the Queen of Sheba, something vital for legitimizing any claim to the throne of any ancient Ethiopian civilization.

Tigray lost considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs in the following centuries due to continuous efforts from the imperial government to centralize power in Addis Ababa, with the exception of 1872, when the Tigrayan King Yohannes IV was crowned emperor of Ethiopia. In 1889 Menilek II, succeeded Yohannes IV in the imperial throne, after his death in the battle of Metema. In 1943 more the 20 thousand peasants and farmers in Tigray revolted against the Ethiopian crown, amid concerns of regional self-governance and growing social unrest. The revolt was brutally suppressed by British RAF forces, confirming, to the Tigrayans, the government's failure of attention to individual ethnic concerns. The Wayne revolt laid the groundwork for increasing Tigrayan dissatisfaction with their national government and centralization of power in the capital, which culminated in the establishment of the TPLF

The creation of the TPLF and its opposition of the Dergue

In 1975, the TPLF was created as a socialist or even communist ethno- nationalist organization, with roots in the student uprisings of 1960- 1974, originally aiming for the creation of an independent Tigrayan state. Immediately, the TPLF started a vicious campaign of guerilla warfare against the central government and the Dergue. The TPLF also began cooperation with Eritrean paramilitary organizations, whose goal was to achieve independence for Eritrea. Although disagreements about ideology and the very principal foundations of revolution were common among those two factions, the alliance made sense from a logistical, tactical and geographical standpoint, as the common prime objective of the groups was the overturn the Dergue regime. Many other similar organizations were formed around that time as an armed attempt of opposition against the Dergue. Such organizations were also established by distinct ethnic groups inside Ethiopia and greatly supported by the most powerful of those, the TPLF.

In 1983 a famine erupted into mostly the northern regions of Ethiopia, including Tigray. It was the dismal response from the Dergue that confirmed the carelessness of the government

for Tigray, in the eyes of the TPLF, and fueled more anger towards the central government. In 1988 the TPLF formed and led a new political and military alliance, known as the Ethiopian People's Revolution Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), composed of various paramilitary organizations inside Ethiopia, who expressed armed resistance against the Dergue and had close connections with the TPLF.

From Opposition to Government

Finally, in 1991 the combined forces of the EPRDF overthrew the Dergue after years of armed conflict. Soon after, the organizations of the EPDRF were reorganized as also political parties and the entire EPDRF as a political coalition, which formed a new Ethiopian government under the president of the TPLF, Meles Zenawi. As forementioned, the relations between the TPLF and Eritrean military forces were always tense and when Ethiopian National Defense Forces clashed with Eritrean Defense Forces in 1998, starting the Ethiopian- Eritrean war, the relations between the two organizations only intensified. Despite Zanawi's passing in 2014, the EPRDF continued to govern Ethiopia, despite growing tension between the other ethnic groups and concerns of corruption in federal offices.

The TPLF again in Opposition

The coalition was eventually disbanded in 2018 and the TPLF refused an invitation to participate in the new national government under prime minister Abiy Ahmed and his new political party, called the Prosperity Party, in contrast to many of their former coalition partners. Instead, the TPLF concentrated on ensuring their local governance over the Tigray region. Disobedience of the national government in Addis Ababa grew significantly the following years, especially as prime minister Ahmed excluded many influential TPLF ministers from his government's cabinet. In September of 2020 the TPLF organized regional elections inside Tigray, despite the national government's decision to postpone those elections due to the Covid-19 pandemic, as an official reason. The elections took place anyway and the TPLF won a landslide victory, securing their legitimacy inside Tigray. As a reaction to growing tensions between the two parties, the armed forces of the TPLF stormed a military station.

Rising tension and the Tigray war

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces were successful in capturing large parts of Tigray with assistance from the Eritrean Defense Forces, who invaded from the north. Thousands of soldiers and civilians were killed on both sides and a report by the New Lines Institutes found that Ethiopian and Eritrean forces conducted acts of genocide against the Tigrayan population under the Geneva conventions of 1949 and Genocide Convention of 1948, including other international documents, and committed ethnic cleansing even after the signage

of the Pretoria Agreement, as the Human Rights Watch reports.^{17 18} As part of the Pretoria Agreements, a new interim local administration was formed in Tigray, excluding the TPLF of local governance in the region.

TPLF internal split and the modern status quote

Getachew Reda, a scholar and TPLF insider who played an important role in the Tigray war, being the TPLF's spokesperson from 2020 until 2024 was appointed president of the interim administration by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2023. Reda then moved ever closer with the federal government, in a move that was striking to the TPLF, which hoped that Reda might become a valuable ally in the Interim Administration. In this context, Reda revealed the participation of many TPLF party officials in human trafficking and other criminal activities. After NEBE refused to reinstate the complete legality of the TPLF as a political party in August of 2024, the controversial 14th party congress of the TPLF took place in Addis Ababa, with Reda and other members abstaining from participation. In the congress, Getachew Reda was removed from the executive committee of the party and ousted from the party as a whole, by TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael. Armed forces loyal to Gebremichael moved, in early October 2024, to capturing government buildings in Tigray, overturning the Interim Administration and effectively placing most of Tigray under the governance of the TPLF once again.. Reda announced the creation of a new political party, the Tigray Solidarity Party (TPS), or Simret in May 2025, which was quickly legitimized by the NEBE. As a reaction to this change in leadership, the federal government restricted the import of certain goods to Tigray and the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) revoked the TPLF's party license. During the recent elections for the lower house of the Ethiopian legislature, the government restricted voting for the entire region of Tigray, among other constituencies, which sparked a fierce reaction from the TPLF, which insisted on holding its party congress, despite government opposition.

¹⁷ "Genocide in Tigray: Serious Breaches of International Law in the Tigray Conflict, Ethiopia, and Paths to Accountability." *NEW LINES INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGY AND POLICY*, June 2024, newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20240604-Report-Genocide-in-Tigray-NLISAP_y.pdf.

¹⁸ "Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce." *Human Rights Watch*, 7 Aug. 2023, www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce.

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

The Republic of Egypt

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Egypt and the Federal Republic of Ethiopia have deteriorated after the federal government of Ethiopia completed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, which compromises the stable flow of water in the Nile, directly challenges Egypt's strategic position in the region as the main controller of the Nile and limits Egyptian access to fresh water, something vital for Egyptian farming and household consumption. Many Egyptian businesses have also sued the Ethiopian government after their multi- million investments in Tigray were destroyed during the Tigray war. ¹⁹Egypt, which prefers a cautious and slow approach of destabilizing its neighboring geopolitical rivals, instead of targeted and sudden attacks, militarily or otherwise, has shared intelligence with the TPLF and aligned itself with Eritrean interests in the Red sea. ^{20 21 22}

The Republic Djibouti

As Ethiopia is the most populated country in the world with no sea access after Eritrea declared independence in 1993. Thus, 95% of Eritrean imports and exports are processed through the port of Djibouti in Djibouti City, the capital of Djibouti. The Tigray War had ripple effects on the economy of Djibouti, as it compromised the stability of one of Djibouti's most important trading partners and of the Djiboutian ports in general, on which the country relies

¹⁹ Awsat, Asharq A. "Egyptian Companies Sue Addis Ababa Internationally." *Asharq Al-Awsat | Explore World News Today*, 24 Aug. 2021,

english.aawsat.com/home/article/3149411/egyptian-companies-sue-addis-ababa-internationally?_wrapper_format=html&page=1.

²⁰ "Why is Egypt Worried About Ethiopia's Dam on the Nile?" *BBC Breaking News, World News, US News, Sports, Business, Innovation, Climate, Culture, Travel, Video & Audio*, 13 Sept. 2023, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66776733.

²¹ Mohammed, Samiya. "Egypt's Geometry of Pressure and the Multi-Front Containment Strategy: Sudan, Tigray and the Logic of Shadow Pressure." *Horn Review*, 8 May 2026, hornreview.org/2026/05/08/egypts-geometry-of-pressure-and-the-multi-front-containment-strategy-sudan-tigray-and-the-logic-of-shadow-pressure/.

²² Abaraya, Mohammedrafi. "Egypt's proxy campaign against Ethiopia in the Horn risks regional meltdown." *The Africa Report – African Politics and Business News*, 20 May 2026, www.theafricareport.com/419136/egypts-proxy-campaign-against-ethiopia-in-the-horn-risks-regional-meltdown/.

upon economically. As a response, the Djiboutian government has expressed support for the Ethiopian federal government during the conflict and the Djiboutian government even returned three TPLF refugees to Ethiopia, despite condemnation of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.²³

Though, in recent months prime minister Abiy Ahmed has expressed his concern of overreliance on Djibouti for Ethiopia's trade and sought to diversify Ethiopia's port access with agreements with Somaliland. As a response, Djibouti has closeted its ties with Egypt, one of Ethiopia's fiercest geopolitical competitors, an action that, though a developing situation, might complicate Djiboutian support of Ethiopia against the TPLF.^{24 25}

United States of America (USA)

Bilateral relations between the United States and Ethiopia have been strained and complicated, particularly in recent years. Through the Badme war the United States was concerned with instability in Ethiopia and in the general region. United States president Joe Biden also expressed humanitarian concerns, specifically concerns of sexual violence and urges for a ceasefire immediately.²⁶ The new Trump administration seemed to change U.S. relations with Ethiopia when, in 2026, the Department of State of the United States announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio was preparing to impose visa restrictions for "hardline" TPLF members and their families, aiming to undermine peace in the region, after the first direct military confrontation between ENDF and the TPLF.²⁷ Despite the shift in policy against the

²³ "East Africa: UNHCR Condemns Forced Return of Three Refugees From Djibouti to Ethiopia." *AllAfrica.com*, 10 June 2021, allafrica.com/stories/202106100240.html.

²⁴ Plaut, Martin. "Guelleh's Hardline Rhetoric: Djibouti's Defiance on Ethiopia's Sovereign Sea Access." *Martin Plaut*, 16 June 2025, martinplaut.com/2025/06/16/guellehs-hardline-rhetoric-djiboutis-defiance-on-ethiopias-sovereign-sea-access/.

²⁵ Assefa, Micheal. "Ethiopia's Demand for Red Sea Access and Its Implications for Regional Political Risks." *Atlas Institute for International Affairs*, 12 June 2025, atlasinstitute.org/ethiopias-demand-for-red-sea-access-and-its-implications-for-regional-political-risks/.

²⁶ "Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict: Biden Demands Ceasefire and End to Abuses." *BBC Breaking News, World News, US News, Sports, Business, Innovation, Climate, Culture, Travel, Video & Audio*, 27 May 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57266110.

²⁷ "Announcement of Targeted Visa Restrictions for Individuals Involved in Undermining Peace in Ethiopia." *United States Department of State*, 18 June 2026, www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/announcement-of-targeted-visa-restrictions-for-individuals-involved-in-undermining-peace-in-ethiopia.

TPLF, Ethiopian- U.S. relations remain harmed, after the U.S. tried to mediate negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia about the GERD. Most recently on the 17th of June 2026, Trump made negative comments about the GERD alongside Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, which strained Ethiopian- U.S. relations further.^{28 29}

The State of Eritrea

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea seemed to be stabilizing with the resolution of the continuous border war following the Badme war in 2018. Eritrea even assisted militarily the ENDF and the Ethiopian government in their campaign against the TPLF in the Tigray war. However, bilateral relations have deteriorated in recent months, as prime minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly stressed the importance of regaining Eritrean ports in the Red sea, partially to diversify Ethiopia's reliance on Djiboutian ports for its international trade. He calls, though, for an international diplomatic mediation for the issue and has dismissed concerns of armed conflict between the two parties.³⁰ Ahmed has also accused Eritrea of mass killings during the Tigray war³¹ and for assisting factions of the TPLF that ousted the interim regional government in Tigray following the Pretoria agreement. As response, Eritrea has withdrawn from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African development organization, in which Ethiopia plays a major economic and strategic role.³² Asmara has also

²⁸ Emam, Amr. "Trump Returns Focus to Nile Dam Dispute, but is It Too Late?" *Al Majalla | The Leading Arab Magazine*, 7 July 2026, en.majalla.com/node/331907/politics/trump-returns-focus-nile-dam-dispute-it-too-late.

²⁹ HORN REVIEW. "Ethiopia–U.S. Structured Dialogue Emerges from Washington Diplomatic Visit." *Horn Review Editorial*, 12 May 2026, hornreview.org/2026/05/12/ethiopia-u-s-structured-dialogue-emerges-from-washington-diplomatic-visit/.

³⁰ Eritrea, Focus. "PM Abiy Repeats Pursuit of Sea Access Peacefully, Dismisses War Specters with Eritrea." *Eritrea Focus | Eritrea Focus is Think Tank & Research Organization*, 4 July 2025, www.eritreafocus.org/pm-abiy-repeats-pursuit-of-sea-access-peacefully-dismisses-war-specters-with-eritreafocus/.

³¹ GETACHEW, SAMUEL. "Ethiopia's Prime Minister Accuses Eritrea of Mass Killings During Tigray War." *AP News*, 3 Feb. 2026, apnews.com/article/ethiopia-eritreafocus-tigray-war-108f32cdd0c24ed009bb623b597b7c96.

³² Araia, Tesfalem, and Hanna Temuari. "Eritrea Leaves Igad Regional Bloc As Tensions Rise with Ethiopia." *BBC Breaking News, World News, US News, Sports, Business, Innovation, Climate, Culture, Travel, Video & Audio*, 12 Dec. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/articles/cliy555k8de30.

pursued a closer strategic partnership with Cairo, particularly in cooperation in the Red sea, further constraining Ethiopia diplomatically.³³

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation has followed a strategic foreign policy of quasi- neutrality on the Ethiopian question. Since both Egypt and Ethiopia are members of the B.R.I.C.S. alliance and Russia enjoys extremely close relations with Eritrea, another Ethiopian geopolitical adversary, the Russian Foreign ministry has repeatedly expressed the need for independent negotiations between Ethiopia and the TPLF to resolve the issue between themselves. They further underline that no external third- party mediator is needed and that any disagreement need to be resolved in good faith only between the parties immediately involved. Russia follows this de facto neutrality in order to not set the trilateral Eritrean- Russo- Ethiopian relations in strain.^{34 35}

People's Republic of China

China's approach to the Ethiopian question has been dominated by pragmatism of maximal strategic and economic gain. During the TPLF's and EPRDF's political dominance of Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was one of their closest diplomatic partners, as many TPLF military officials had received training in China and the TPLF followed a generally left-wing economic agenda.

After the dismemberment of the EPRDF and the ousting of the TPLF from power, China continued to improve relations with the Ethiopian state under the PP of prime minister Ahmed and Ethiopia officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative in October of 2018. Even though China pulled out Chinese construction workers developing Chinese investments in Ethiopia and followed a similar diplomatic approach as Russia for the duration of the Tigray war, later China

³³ "Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray: A Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa." *International Crisis Group*, 18 Feb. 2026, www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa.

³⁴ Caprio, Stefano. "The Strategic Alliance Between Russia and Eritrea." *AsiaNews*, 8 July 2026, www.asianews.it/en/north-asia/russia/the-strategic-alliance-between-russia-and-eritrea.

³⁵ Russian news agency. "Ethiopia Grateful to Russia for Its Position on Tigray Crisis, Ambassador to Moscow Says." *TASS*, 23 Aug. 2021, tass.com/world/1329199?ref=pesacheck.org.

expressed support for the Ethiopian federal government. They have also started major industrial projects in the country and Chinese workers assisted in the construction of the GERD.³⁶

European Union (EU)

Before the Tigray war relations between the European Union and Ethiopia were stable as the two parties were important trading partners and Ethiopia was receiving hundreds of millions in budgetary support from the EU. Ethiopia was also benefiting from the profitable "Everything But Arms" (EBA) trading agreement of the EU. As war broke out in Ethiopia the European Union criticized the Ethiopian government for human rights abuses and suspended the important direct budgetary support to Ethiopia. The E.U. supported the Pretoria Agreement in 2022, quickly restored support to Ethiopia and normalized bilateral relations, having also invested in renewable energy and digital technology in Ethiopia.³⁷ Furthermore, the E.U. heavily criticized the TPLF for annulling the Pretoria Agreement and threatening the stability of the Federation after members of the organization overturned the interim local government Tigray, which was formed following the Pretoria Agreement.³⁸

African Union (AU)

The African Union was an important mediator of the Pretoria Agreement and deeply concerned with the humanitarian crisis during the war. The A.U. has been closely following the developing situation in Ethiopia and has continuously urged for a permanent implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, which can be considered biased in favor of the Ethiopian federal government.³⁹ Despite this, the organization has remained firm in its stance of neutrality and refraining to draw

³⁶ Nantulya, Paul. "The Misalignment Between Chinese and African Peacemaking: The Case of Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis." *Home • Stimson Center*, 6 Apr. 2026, www.stimson.org/2026/the-misalignment-between-chinese-and-african-peacemaking-the-case-of-ethiopias-tigray-crisis/#elementor-toc_heading-anchor-3.

³⁷ Directorate-General for International Partnerships. "Commissioner Sikela Announces Resumption of Budget Support and Strengthened Partnership with Ethiopia at Business Forum." *International Partnerships*, 20 Apr. 2026, international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/commissioner-sikela-announces-resumption-budget-support-and-strengthened-partnership-ethiopia-2026-04-20_en.

³⁸ Dam, Philippe. "EU's Relations with Ethiopia Ignore Grim Human Rights Reality." *Human Rights Watch*, 22 Apr. 2026, www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/22/eus-relations-with-ethiopia-ignore-grim-human-rights-reality.

³⁹ Hagos, Desta H. "The AU Turned Pretoria Into Abiy's Shield." *Ethiopia Insight*, 1 June 2026, www.ethiopia-insight.com/2026/05/20/the-au-turned-pretoria-into-abiys-shield/.

heavy criticism to any side Instead, the A.U. underlines its position as mediator between the two parties. ⁴⁰

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

DATE	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
12 September 1974	The Dergue overthrows the imperial government under emperor Haile Selassie I, ending imperial governance over Ethiopia after hundreds of years. The ascend of the Dergue marks the beginning of the TPLF's rise to national prominence with it's continuous opposition against the regime.
21 May 1991	President Mengistu Haile Mariam flees to Zimbabwe following the success of the TPLF's and EPRDF's military campaigns of guerilla warfare to overthrow the military dictatorship. The TPLF finally comes into power in Ethiopia.
24 May 1993	The Eritrean People's Liberation Front declares the independence of Eritrea following a UN- backed referendum. The first modern Eritrean state is established.
8 December 1994	The constitution establishing the Federal Republic of Ethiopia is adopted, underlying the principle of federal administration of the nation, replacing the unitarian system of governance of the Dergue.

⁴⁰ "Press Statement: Following the Situation in the Tigray Region, Ethiopia." *African Union*, au.int/en/pressreleases/20250314/press-statement-following-situation-tigray-region-ethiopia. Accessed 14 Mar. 2025.

6 May 1998	Border disputes among the Ethiopian and Eritrean states led to the begin of armed conflict between the two, known as the Badme War. This act now officially constituted the TPLF as enemies of Eritren forces.
12 December 2000	Signage of the Algiers agreement, officially ending the Badme war, although border clashes contiunied between the two parties until 2018.
24 May 2015	Controversial elections for the House of Peoples' Representatives took place across Ethiopian which the ruling EPRDF and their allies won every single seat. The irregularities in the electoral process and intimidation of the opposition led to social unrest against the government. These elections signaled the end of TPLF governance in Ethiopia.
2 April 2018	Dr. Abiy Ahmed was inaugurated to the position of prime minister. Ehiopians were excited and enthusiastic with the inaguration of Ahmed, as he promised to consolidate peace in Ethiopia, internally and externally.
10 December 2019	Prime Minister Ahmed received the Nobel Piece Prize in Oslo for resolving tensions with Eritrea. This angered the TPLF, as now the Ethiopian government was not preoccupied with Eritrea and potentially could ally with the TPLF's historic rival against them.
4 November 2020	Armed conflict began between the TPLF and ENDF, starting the most modern antipathy of the federal government by the TPLF.

2 November 2022	The Pretoria Agreement was signed in Pretoria, South Africa officially ceasing hostilities between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government. In reality, the fragility of the agreement would lead to years of instability.
13 August 2024	The controversial 14th congress of the TPLF starts in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The congress signals the internal split of the TLF between Interim Administration president Getachew Reda and TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael. The split would directly lead to the coup in Tigray.
7 October 2024	A faction of the TPLF overturned the interim regional administration of Tigray, formed in accordance with the Pretoria agreement. This action symbolized the reemergence of the TPLF as a prominent resistance to the federal government, now with a solid territory under their control to base their operations from. ⁴¹
1 June 2026	The most recent elections for the House of Peoples' Representatives took place in Ethiopia. They were heavily criticized as only a confirmation of Abiy Ahmed's consolidation of power in Ethiopia, particularly as the entire region of Tigray, as well as other constituencies in Ethiopia were suspended from the voting process and their seats in the House of Peoples' Representatives will remain void.

⁴¹ Harter, Fred. "Power Struggle Leads to Coup in Tigray As War Looms Between Ethiopia and Eritrea." *The Guardian*, 21 Mar. 2025, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/mar/21/tigray-mekelle-coup-war-ethiopia-eritrea-assab-port-abiy-ahmed.

RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES AND EVENTS

Human Rights Council resolution S-33/1

This resolution, among other notices on the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia during the Tigray war, established the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) in December of 2021, which was mandated with observing the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia and Tigray and any actions by the TPLF or the federal government of Ethiopia that might undermine international humanitarian law. In the 51st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) the commission announced credible evidence of crimes against humanity and other actions constituting as war crimes to have been committed by the Ethiopian federal government.⁴² Furthermore, the Commission came to the conclusion that actions of the TPLF could be categorized as human rights abuses, some of which amount to war crimes. The abuse of woman, including sexual violence and rape was also not uncommon and executed by both relevant parties.⁴³

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

Pretoria Agreement

The Pretoria agreement is largely perceived as a failure, as just four years after its implementation, conversations about a renewed armed confrontation between the TPLF and the ENDF have only increased in recent months and Ethiopian stability remains fragile. One main reason for its failure might be its overreliance on good faith between two historic rivals, whose disagreements can be traced back to hundreds of years ago. It is also important to mention that important articles of the Agreement were not implemented properly by the two parties, such as but not limited to the total disarmament of the TPLF.^{44 45}

⁴² International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia. "International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia United Nations Human Rights Council -51st Session." *United Nations Human Rights Council*, 22 Sept. 2022, www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2022/09/international-commission-human-rights-experts-ethiopia-united.

⁴³ "Document Viewer." *UNDOCS*, 17 Dec. 2021, docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/S-33/1.

⁴⁴ Assefa, Micheal. "Google Search." *Antlas Institute for International Affairs*, 28 Feb. 2026, atlasinstitute.org/ethiopia-after-pretoria-why-tigrays-peace-remains-fragile/.

⁴⁵ "AGREEMENT FOR LASTING PEACE THROUGH A PERMANENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA AND

A3+1 diplomatic mission

The A3 group was established in 2013 and it consists of three African member states of the Security Council, focusing on “advancing African priorities” and drawing attention to the needs of and humanitarian situations in the African continent by delivering joint statements, following private humanitarian reports and proposed resolutions in the Security Council. During their term as a Non- Permanent Member of the Security Council, in 2020 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, aligning themselves with the principals of the A3 grouping, joined the A3 as the “plus” member. This seat is today reserved for any like minded nation outside of Africa wishing to join the A3.⁴⁶ The A3+ group regularly organized joint statements about the Tigray war, expressing grave humanitarian concerns, in particular about the killing of civilians. As an example, in 2021 they urged the Ethiopian government to withdraw all of their ENDF from Tigray and to respect peacebuilding efforts. The vision of the A3+ group in the Tigray war unfortunately was not fulfilled in its entirety, as their efforts in the Security Council were inadequate for absolving this issue.^{47 48}

Efforts by the African Union

The African Union has closely been monitoring the situation in Ethiopia, since the outbreak of war, in 2020. The AU was the main mediator of the Pretoria agreement and the chairmanship of the AU by South Africa and its President Cyril Ramaphosa paid great attention to the matter. Unfortunately, other organs of the AU, such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), failed to form an organized response to the issue. Furthermore, the AU-backed Pretoria Agreement did not stand, and the two parties did not properly implement the agreement. Moreover, the mechanism established by the agreement for its implementation, which was

THE TIGRAY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT (TPLF)." *IGAD | IGAD Peace, Prosperity and Regional Integration*, igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf.

⁴⁶ "From the Margins to the Center: The Rise of the A3 in the UN Security Council." *Security Council Report*, 19 Nov. 2025, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A3_research_report_2025.pdf.

⁴⁷ "THE SITUATION IN TIGRAY." *Africanunion-un*, 26 Aug. 2021, www.africanunion-un.org/post/the-situation-in-tigray. Accessed 26 Aug. 2021.

⁴⁸ Dersso, Solomon A., and Kaleab T. Sigatu. "Can a Unified Leadership of the A3+ Help in Navigating the Geopolitical Gridlock in the UN Security Council in Relation to African Files?" *Amani Africa*, 3 Nov. 2025, amani-africa-et.org/can-a-unified-leadership-of-the-a3-help-in-navigating-the-geopolitical-gridlock-in-the-un-security-council-in-relation-to-african-files/.

monitored by the AU, was flawed and inconsistent, failing to fully enact the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement.^{49 50}

United Nations Security Council resolutions

The absence of any UN Security Council resolution on the topic is certainly notable, particularly as the scale of the conflict is taken into consideration, and not even any draft resolutions on the topic are released to the public. Reportedly, efforts to propose resolutions on the topic were abandoned after a common consensus was not reached between diplomats from the member states of the Security council in `2020 and 2021, after secretive negotiations restricted to the public and not officially on the agenda of Security Council meetings. This result is consistent with Russian and Chinese foreign policy during the conflict, as they insisted that the Tigrayan war is primarily an internal matter of Ethiopia and no international mediators, barring African ones, such as the African Union, should interfere in the resolution of the conflict. Thus any proposed resolution in regard to the Tigrayan war in the Security Council was under threat from the use of Veto from the Chinese or Russian delegations, canceling the process completely.⁵¹

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Travel restrictions on involved persons

The Security Council possesses an array of useful measures with which it can exert pressure over the persons involved in the Tigray Conflict. Delegates may issue travel bans to leaders of the TPLF or members of the Cabinet of the federal government of Ethiopia, even the prime minister himself or any family members of the involved persons, as the US have already done. This will undeniably engage the politicians involved in the crisis to a personal level, instead of a purely political one. As such, they might consider showing a positive spirit of cooperation to the international community in order to be able to travel internationally, not only

⁴⁹ Luna. "How the African Union Failed Tigray." *Omna Tigray*, 4 Sept. 2022, omnatigray.org/how-the-african-union-failed-tigray/.

⁵⁰ FOUNDATION, OBSERVER R. "The African Union and the Tigray Crisis." *Orfonline.org*, 26 Apr. 2021, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-african-union-and-the-tigray-crisis.

⁵¹ "Exclusive: How the UN drops Tigray resolution after second attempt failed." *Addis Standard*, 6 Mar. 2021, addisstandard.com/exclusive-how-the-un-drops-tigray-resolution-after-second-attempt-failed/.

for personal leisure, but also for formal negotiations with the hope of receiving international support for their respective cause.

Arms trade restrictions

The Security Council can also impose restrictions on the sale of arms to either side of the conflict by any foreign international power with the goal of preventing the worst- case scenario of a renewed armed military escalation, similar to the one in 2020. A monitoring body can be also established, with the goal of overseeing the prevention of any illegal arms imports to Ethiopia or Tigray. Any monitoring organization on imports to Ethiopia will most likely require the consent and full cooperation of the states of Eritrea, Somaliland and , more importantly, Djibouti, as most of the region's imports pass through Djibouti. Such a clause has realistic chances of being approved by the Security Council, as it aligns with Russia's foreign policy direction of minimizing external involvement to the Ethiopian question. A provision can be added, so that if such sanctions are not respected by any state or organization immediate trade or political sanctions can be implemented against such state or organization automatically or reviewed by a committee of international legal experts in order for the examined party to be punished according to international trade practices.

Direct embargo on Ethiopian imports

The restriction of Ethiopian imports through the Red Sea will be an effective solution in convincing the Ethiopian federal government to open talks between the TPLF and Ethiopian delegators and accelerate reestablishing stability in the region. Such restrictions can be in the form of an embargo on Ethiopian imports and exports through the port of Djibouti, carried out by Djiboutian coast guard officers. For such a plan to be properly implemented, once again, the total cooperation of the Djiboutian state is required. It might be difficult to secure Djibouti's support for such a goal, as Ethiopia is an important economic partner of Djibouti. Perhaps the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO) could recover certain lost revenue for Djibouti from the disruption of trade with Ethiopia, in order for the Djiboutian state to be persuaded into properly enforcing the embargo. This action risks heavy criticism for members of the international community aligned with Ethiopia, as vital supplies for the Ethiopian populace pass daily through the port. In such cases, exceptions for food and medical supplies are welcomed, in order to not risk igniting new humanitarian concerns among unarmed, Ethiopian citizens.

Direct deployment of UN peacekeeping forces

A more radical, but certainly tactically feasible solution, would be the direct deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the border of Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia with the goal of preventing armed escalation between the two parties. Such action would most likely be met with infuriating reactions from the delegations, most friendly to Ethiopia and certainly the Russian one, as they

generally condemn international mediation in the internal instability of Ethiopia. As a compromise, a hybrid UN-AU military mission may be organized where African member states aligned with Russia, such as South Sudan or Niger may contribute soldiers for the mission, in an attempt of appeasement of the Russian delegation. It should be noted that Russia still might demand the presence of armed forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the peacekeeping force, though deployment of such divisions might complicate the balance structure of the situation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Bibliography

"A Very Ethiopian Tragedy: Tigray, the TPLF, and Cyclical History." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 28 Jan. 2021, gjia.georgetown.edu/conflict-security/a-very-ethiopian-tragedy-tigray-the-tplf-and-cyclical-history/.

"Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea." THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, www.peaceagreements.org/agreements/2098/.

"Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia." Supporting Constitution Builders Globally | ConstitutionNet, constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Ethiopia_Constitution.pdf.

"Ethiopia - March 2025." International IDEA, Mar. 2025, www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/ethiopia/march-2025.

"Ethiopia (Tigray): Briefing and Consultations." Security Council Report, 25 Aug. 2021, www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/08/ethiopia-tigray-briefing-and-consultations.php.

"Ethiopia claims Tigrayan forces preparing offensive against govt." France 24, 11 June 2026, www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260611-ethiopia-claims-tigrayan-forces-preparing-offensive-against-govt.

"Ethiopia's Tigray War: The Short, Medium and Long Story." BBC Breaking News, World News, US News, Sports, Business, Innovation, Climate, Culture, Travel, Video & Audio, 17 Nov. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378.

"History." Britannica, www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Sports-and-recreation#ref129421.

"Italian East Africa." Britannica, www.britannica.com/place/Italian-Somaliland.

"Security Council 'deeply concerned' by expanding clashes in northern Ethiopia." United Nations, 11 Nov. 2021, news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1105072.

Africa, Amani. "Briefing on the AU Led Peace Process for Ethiopia." Amani Africa, 23 Nov. 2022, amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-au-led-peace-process-for-ethiopia/.

"Socialist Ethiopia (1974–91)." Britannica, www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Ethiopia/The-rise-and-reign-of-Haile-Selassie-I-1916-74#ref401090.

"Strong Evidence That Ethiopia Committed Genocide in Tigray War: Report." Al Jazeera, 4 June 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/4/strong-evidence-that-ethiopia-committed-genocide-in-tigray-war-report.

"Tigray." Encyclopedia Britannica, 22 Mar. 2026, www.britannica.com/place/Tigray-historical-region-Ethiopia.

Birru, Jalale G. "The TPLF's Move to Fully Control Tigray Poses a Growing and Expanding Threat in the Horn of Africa." ACLED, 2 June 2026, acleddata.com/report/tplfs-move-fully-control-tigray-poses-growing-and-expanding-threat-horn-africa.

Agencies, News. "Ethiopia to Designate TPLF, OLF-Shene As 'terror' Groups." Al Jazeera, 1 May 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/1/ethiopia-to-designate-tplf-olf-shene-as-terror-groups.

Center for Preventive Action. "Conflict in Ethiopia." Global Conflict Tracker, 18 Feb. 2026, www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia.

"Ethiopia - Haile Selassie, Imperialism, Revolution | Britannica." Encyclopedia Britannica, 26 Feb. 2026, www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/The-rise-and-reign-of-Haile-Selassie-I-1916-74.

"Ethiopia Bans the TPLF." Global Politics - Ethiopia Bans the TPLF, 7 June 2025, globalpolitics.in/africa/africa-weekly.php?url=Global%20Politics%20Explainer&recordNo=1702.

Bureau of African Affairs. "U.S. Relations With Ethiopia." United States Department of State, 20 Nov. 2023, 2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ethiopia/.

C.I.A. "The World Factbook 1982." Geographic.org Geography, Climate, Countries, Maps, Flags, Population, Central Intelligence Agency, geographic.org/wfb1982/worldfactbook82natiilli.pdf.

Contributor. "Tigray's Reckoning: Who Killed the Pretoria Agreement, Why Accountability Cannot Wait, and What Just Peace Actually Requires." The Reporter, 2 May 2026, www.thereporterethiopia.com/50473/.

Cook, Pip. "UN Rights Body Passes Resolution on Ethiopia's Tigray Region." Geneva Solutions, 13 July 2021, genevasolutions.news/peace-humanitarian/un-rights-body-passes-resolution-on-ethiopia-s-tigray-region.

United Nations Human Rights Council. "Resolution 47/13 (Tigray, Ethiopia) A/HRC/RES/47/13." GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 8 July 2021, www.globalr2p.org/resources/resolution-47-13-tigray-ethiopia-a-hrc-res-47-13/.

Goddard, James. "Ethiopia: Conflict and food insecurity 40 years on from the 1984 famine." House of Lords Library, 10 Oct. 2024, lordslibrary.parliament.uk/ethiopia-conflict-and-food-insecurity-40-years-on-from-the-1984-famine/#heading-1.

M. Doornbos, M., et al. "A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia." Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2 Sept. 2008, research.vu.nl/ws/portafiles/portal/77594970/complete%20dissertation.pdf.

Maschio, Laura. "New Tigray Interim Government Signals Progress Toward Peace in Ethiopia." L'Osservatorio: Research Centre on Civilian Victims of Conflicts, www.losservatorio.org/en/civilians-in-conflict/web-review/item/3945-new-tigray-interim-government-signals-progress-toward-peace-in-ethiopia?tmpl=component&print=1.

Mules, Ineke. "Ethiopia: A Timeline of the Tigray Crisis." Dw.com, 17 Nov. 2020, www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-a-timeline-of-the-tigray-crisis/a-55632181.

Press releases, Human Rights Council. "Human Rights Council Adopts Three Resolutions on Human Rights in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, Human Rights in the Context of HIV and AIDS, and on Violence against Women and Girls with Disabilities." UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 14 July 2021, www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/07/human-rights-council-adopts-three-resolutions-human-rights-tigray-region.

Rigoli, Margherita. "Russia Strengthens Ties with Eritrea: A Strategic Shift in the Horn of Africa." NATO Defense Collage Foundation, 3 July 2024,

www.natofoundation.org/africa/russia-strengthens-ties-with-eritrea-a-strategic-shift-in-the-horn-of-africa/.

Stanley, Aaron. "After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election." CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 18 June 2026, www.csis.org/analysis/after-supermajority-ethiopias-trajectory-following-2026-election.

Taylor, Magnus. "Power Struggle in Ethiopia's Tigray: Averting a Return to War." International Crisis Group, 15 May 2025, www.crisisgroup.org/qna/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/power-struggle-ethiopias-tigray-averting-return-war.

Vértesy, László. "Public Administration Developments in Ethiopia Under Three Different Regimes." Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 11 Nov. 2022, ccpa-journal.eu/index.php/ccpa/article/view/287.

Media Bibliography

"Peace and security in Africa - Security Council." *UN Web TV*, 6 Oct. 2021, webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1b/k1bz0f6wug.

VOX. "Why Ethiopia is in a civil war." *YouTube*, VOX, 28 May 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1Yd5vJ6og

