Forum: Disarmament and International Security GA1

Issue: Reassessing the effectiveness of Security Measures in Confrontation Over Taiwan

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most crucial and challenging security matters in East Asia and across the world is the persistent dispute over Taiwan. Being one of the most sensitive geopolitical issues, the relationship between Taiwan and China has become a key topic in the media and the political world. In its attempts to reinforce its claims over Taiwan, whether through imposing military intimidation, implementing grey zone strategies or applying diplomatic pressure, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is escalating the risks Taiwan is facing in regard to its sovereignty and democratic lifestyle. China's fixation on reunifying with Taiwan has escalated to the point where the application of force is being considered.Taiwan has initiated different security measures to prevent any act of hostility after that. Additionally, by improving its military readiness and efficiency while enhancing the resilience of its population, Taiwan is further preparing for any unforeseen hostile act. Being on China's strategically significant sea border thus playing a vital role in global trade networks, is how Taiwan's view of modern China shaped. Moreover, Taiwan has played a significant role in the history of Chinese migration by hosting a crucial number of the ethnic Chinese community since the beginning of the 21st century which made it one of the first locations the Chinese chose to immigrate to and to settle in.

The aim of this study guide is to provide delegates with a comprehensive framework that will enable them to understand and to critically reevaluate the effectiveness of the security initiatives taken amid the changing geopolitical circumstances. Therefore, in order to gain a better, thorough understanding of the complicated initiatives designed and proposed to ensure peace, security and stability in Taiwan Strait, acquiring knowledge and gaining information on the strategic development of asymmetric warfare, cyber defense tactics and legal reform in Taiwan is essential. Should you have any questions regarding the topic feel free to contact me on despoinainfragkia@gmail.com.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Grey Zone

The gray zone phenomenon is also referred to as hybrid threats, sharp power, political warfare, malign influence, irregular warfare, and modern deterrence. Although it reflects an age-old approach, it is newly broad in its application. Today, the toolkit for coercion below the level of direct warfare includes information operations, political intimidation, economic coercion, cyber operations, proxy support, and provocation by state-controlled Forces. China, Russia, Iran, and

North Korea, as well as non-state actors, are increasingly turning to these strategies to overcome U.S. strengths in global diplomacy, law, and commerce.[1]

Asymmetric Warfare

Unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other.[2]

Cost Imposition [3]

Cost imposition strategies aim to provoke a reaction from the opponent that results in a disadvantage or burden, thereby benefiting the country that initiates the action. Cost impositions are competitive approaches used primarily in international relations and military contexts that aim to induce an adversary to respond in ways that create a hardship differential favoring the initiating nation. This means the initiating country deliberately takes actions that force its opponent to bear disproportionately higher costs either financial, operational, or political while minimizing its own costs, thereby gaining a relative advantage in the competition.

Cybersecurity Command and Control

A Cybersecurity Command is a specialized military or governmental entity tasked with safeguarding a nation's crucial digital infrastructure and information systems against cyber threats. This command undertakes both defensive and offensive cyber operations, collaborates on national cyber defense strategies, monitors cyber threats, and synchronizes cyber capabilities across different branches of the military or governmental organizations. Its function is essential in mitigating cyberattacks that could disrupt communications, energy, transportation, and other vital services, particularly in contemporary conflicts where cyber warfare plays a significant role in national security.[4]

Economic Sanctions

These are sanctions that other countries place, in this case, on China, such as asset freezes or trade restrictions, to discourage aggression or penalise actions against Taiwan.[5]

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[1] www.csis.org. (n.d.). *Gray Zone Project | Center for Strategic and International Studies*. [online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/programs/gray-zone-project.

[2] Sexton, E. (2019). Asymmetrical warfare | Britannica. In: *Encyclopædia Britannica*. [online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/asymmetrical-warfare.

[3] "+Caption.byline+." "Quick Links." Air University, www.airuniversity.af.edu/.

[4] "What Are Command and Control (C&C) Attacks?" Crowdstrike.com, 2019, www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cyberattacks/command-and-control-cac-attack/.

[5] Kuno, Arata. *China's Economic Sanctions: Its Features and Effectiveness*, The Japan Forum on International Relations "Competition for U.S.-China Hegemony and Indo-Pacific Geoeconomics" Study Group, Apr. 2021, www.jfir.or.jp/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/04/210420ka-en.pdf.

Anti-Secession Law

China's law permits the use of force against Taiwan in some situations, as when the island declares its independence. [6]

First Island Chain

The first island chain roughly refers to the chain of islands encompassing Japan, Taiwan, portions of the Philippines, and Indonesia. [7]

Military Modernization

Modernization of the Armed Forces (AF) is a complex process, which includes cardinal changes of the material capacities in order to accomplish all the strategic objectives. The Armed Forces aim at increasing the qualitative levels through their transformation into a professional force, well-trained, equipped with contemporary systems of the technique and armament, modern and interoperable tools as well as capable of accomplishing operations of a larger spectrum. The process of modernization of the AF serves this aim. [8]

Territorial Integrity

Territorial integrity is a fundamental concept in international law and politics, referring to the principle that states should not interfere with the territorial boundaries of other states. This concept has been a cornerstone of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established the principle of sovereignty and the modern system of nation-states.[9]

Status quo[10]

The present situation or the existing state of affairs .[11]

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[6] Yu-chen, Chung, and Lee Hsin-Yin. "U.S. Reaffirms Support for Taiwan on Anti-Secession Law Anniversary - Focus Taiwan." *Focus Taiwan - CNA English News*, 19 Mar. 2025, focustaiwan.tw/politics/202503190014#:~:text=Enacted%20on%20March%2014%2C%202005%2C%20China's%20Anti%2DSecession,stated%20in%20Article%201%20of%20the%20law.

[7] Erickson, Andrew S., and Joel Wuthnow. "Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific 'Island Chains'*: The China Quarterly." *Cambridge Core*, Cambridge University Press, 21 Jan. 2016, www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/barriers-springboards-and-benchmarks-china-conceptualizes-the-pacific-island-chains/B46A212145EB9D920616650669C697F0.

[8] Muçi Sejdini, and Super User. "What Is the Modernization of Armed Forces (Means, Techniques and Infrastructure)." *Mod.gov.al*, 2025, www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/security-policies/others-from-mod/modernization/67-what-is-the- modernization-of-armed-forces-means-techniques-and-infrastructure.

[9] Lee, Sarah. "Territorial Integrity: A Comprehensive Guide." Numberanalytics.com, 2025, www.numberanalytics.com/blog/ultimate-guide-territorial-integrity-political-geography.

[10] Oxford Languages. "Oxford Languages." Oxford Languages, Oxford University Press, 2025, languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/.

[11] Cambridge Dictionary. "THE STATUS QUO | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary." Cambridge.org, 5 Feb. 2020, dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/status-quo.

Deterrence

Deterrence is a military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an attack from an adversary power.[12]

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Historical Background

Historical evidence indicates that the Qing dynasty, which was the last imperial dynasty of China lasting from 1644 to 1912, first gained complete authority over Taiwan in the 17th century. In 1895, Japan emerged victorious in the First Sino-Japanese War, prompting the Qing administration to hand over Taiwan to Japan. Following World War II, Japan surrendered and returned control of the territory it had acquired from China. Shortly thereafter, a civil conflict broke out in mainland China between the nationalist forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party led by Mao Zedong. The Chinese Revolution in 1949 led to the Creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the 1st of October of the same year.[13] This announcement, made by Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, put an end to the costly full-scale civil war between the two parties.

Chinese Civil War 1945-1949

China consisted of three territories throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945): Communist China, Nationalist China, which the government ruled, and lastly, territories occupied by the Japanese Empire, as showcased in the following map. Although Chinese armed units were allegedly united under the United Front Banner in efforts to combat the long-lasting Japanese occupation, an alliance was formed between the Nationalists and the Communists. However, this resulted in each of them being pitted against the other two. Because of their long-standing political and military rivalry for control of China, Nationalists and Communists remained enemies regardless of their alliance.[14]On the 14th of August 1945, after China had undergone eight years of armed conflict and decades-long occupation by the Japanese Empire, Japan finally agreed to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered. By that time, millions had lost their lives on battlefields, while others had passed due to illness or malnutrition. Nonetheless, the end of World War II did not mean that the battles in China had ended.

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[12] The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. "Deterrence | Political and Military Strategy." Encyclopædia Britannica, 12 June 2017, www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy.

[13] Calavaro, L. (2025). *Understanding the China-Taiwan Tensions: A Strategic Perspective - Security Outlines*. [online] Security Outlines - česko-slovenský portál o bezpečnosti. Available at: Understanding the China-Taiwan Tensions: A Strategic Perspective - Security Outlines

[14] ---. "United Front | Chinese History [1937-1945]." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 18 Sept. 2018, www.britannica.com/topic/United-Front-Chinese-history-1937-1945.

The defeat of Japan sparked a struggle between the Communists and Nationalists for control of vital resources and populated regions in Manchuria and northern China. The majority of East and North China's railway networks, as well as significant cities, were taken by nationalist forces using American military transportation assets. Much of Manchuria and the northern interior regions were occupied by Communist forces. The United Front was always in flux, and both the Nationalists and the Communists tacitly agreed to work together only until Japan was vanquished; neither side could afford to appear to put its interests ahead of the national struggle during that time. The Communists were on the rise in 1945 as a result of the Nationalists' growing incompetence and corruption during the war, which made them seem to the North Chinese in particular like a government-in-exile in far-off Chongqing.[15]

Hopes for a negotiated settlement between China's Communists and Nationalists arose following Japan's surrender in 1945. Both sides agreed in principle to work towards a united and democratic China by October 1945 after Chiang Kai-shek summoned Mao Zedong to Chongqing to discuss reunification. However, before more talks could begin, resurgent combat resulted from unresolved political and military difficulties.

General George C.Marshall's Mission to China, 1945-1947

The Marshall Mission is an early example of American attempts to arbitrate civil wars and influence geopolitical outcomes in Asia. The Marshall Mission in China is still significant today. The lessons learnt from this mission continue to influence American diplomacy and foreign policy. In addition to influencing the course of the Chinese Civil War and the final ascent of the Communist Party, its inability to bring Nationalists and Communists together after World

[15] Tsuji, Chinatsu. "Chinese Civil War | Summary, Causes, & Results." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 16 Feb. 2018, www.britannica.com/event/Chinese-Civil-War.

War II also had an impact on U.S. Cold War policy and methods for resolving international conflicts.

In November 1945, General George C.Marshall was appointed as President Truman's special ambassador to China and was assigned to negotiate a cease-fire between the Chinese Communist and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. The question of political unification led to a quick stalling of peace talks following the declaration of a ceasefire in January 1946 and agreements on military integration, political reforms, and government restructuring. Following Marshall's mission, negotiations between the two sides were momentarily resumed; however, new hostilities erupted in Manchuria and other locations before these accords were fully implemented. Marshall returned to the United States in early 1947 without finding a lasting solution after failing to heal the profound rifts.

The detailed documentation of the Marshall mission encompassing meeting minutes, U.S. advisers' reports, and field notes on cease-fire breaches still ranks as one of the top English-language references for grasping China's political and military landscape post-World War II, along with U.S. policy during this pivotal time.[16] [17]

The end of the Chinese Civil War

As the civil war intensified from 1947 to 1949, a Communist victory appeared increasingly probable. Even though the Communists lacked control of significant cities following World War II, they possessed solid grassroots backing, enhanced military structure and morale, along with substantial weapon caches taken from Japanese resources in Manchuria. Years of corruption and poor governance had diminished public backing for the Nationalist Government. In early 1947, the ROC Government began considering the island province of Taiwan, located off the coast of Fujian Province, as a possible place of retreat. While officials in the Truman Administration were skeptical about the strategic significance of maintaining ties with Nationalist China, no one in the U.S. Government wished to be blamed for aiding the "loss" of China to communism. Support in terms of military and financial assistance for the struggling Nationalists persisted, although not to the extent that Chiang Kai-shek desired. [18]

On October 1, 1949, the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Zedong was officially declared by the Communist Party of China (CCP). This date marks the end of the Chinese Civil War and the CCP's victory over the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), which had fled to Taiwan.

Early Military Crisis 1950

In the early 1950s, East Asia saw noteworthy changes as an outcome of the global Cold War and the spread of communism in the region. After Mao Zedong's Communist Party claimed

[16] "General George C. Marshall's Mission to China, 1945-1947." General George C. Marshall's Mission to China, 1945-1947

[17] "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, the Far East: China, Volume X - Office of the Historian." History.state.gov, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v10/d18.

[18] Office of the Historian. "The Chinese Revolution of 1949." State.gov, United States Department of State, 2016, history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev.

victory over the Chinese civil war, the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government, commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan. Today,the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) both declare themselves to be the legitimate government of all of China, which has led to a continuous military and political standoff across the Taiwan Strait.

The Korean War (1950–1953) also had a major impact on U.S. strategy in Asia at the same time. The start of the Korean War highlighted Taiwan's vital role as an obstacle on communist expansion, putting American outposts in Japan and the Philippines in jeopardy. President Truman had been at first hesitant to make an intervention in Taiwan.

When the U.S Seventh Fleet was instructed to monitor the Taiwan Strait to prevent a PRC attack in Taiwan, notable American military and financial assistance were sent to the ROC. In order to bring an end to the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia, alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO) were formed.

First Taiwan Strait Crisis September 3, 1954- May 1, 1955

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, or SEATO, was established in September 1954 by the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. While it was known as the "Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation", just two Southeast Asian nations became members. The People's Republic of China (PRC) started heavily bombarding the Republic of China (ROC)-controlled offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu, which are situated just off the Chinese mainland near Xiamen, with heavy artillery in August 1954, the same month that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established with the objective of containing the spread of communism in the region. Both involved parties, the PRC and the ROC, considered these islands to be strategically significant. The PRC aimed to eliminate the threat provided by the ROC before the planned creation of a Northeast Asian Treaty Organisation (NEATO), which might have comprised the US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In order to provide collective security, the United States was able to station military forces on and near ROC territory after the Sino-American Mutual Security Treaty was signed in December 1954. Both parties are dedicated to strengthening their defences against communist rebellions and armed aggression. After the approval of the Formosa Resolution by the US Congress in January 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower was given the authority to mobilize military aid in order to help preserve Taiwan and the surrounding Islands claimed by it. The US commitment to combat the spread of communism is demonstrated through its involvement in the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO) in September 1954. The PRC's willingness to hold talks with the US in April 1955 put an end to the crisis, but the underlying problems were not resolved in the following conversations.[19]

Alliances and U.S. Involvement during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

The U.S. initially refrained from intervening in the offshore islands' defense, as its mutual defense treaty with the ROC covered only Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, not the smaller offshore islands, which were seen as less strategically vital and a potential trigger for war with the Soviet Union.In spite of this, the United States and the Republic of China signed a mutual defence pact on December 1, 1954, which reaffirmed the United States' commitment to defend

[19] Munro, Andre. "Taiwan Strait Crises | History, Facts, Map, & Significance | Britannica." Www.britannica.com, 9 May 2024, www.britannica.com/event/Taiwan-Strait-crises.

Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, with the possibility of expanding protection to other islands through mutual consent.[20]

Second Taiwan Strait crisis August 23, 1958- November 1958[21]

As Sino-Soviet tensions increased, the PRC resumed its offensive in August 1958, unleashing a heavy artillery barrage on Kinmen and Matsu without Soviet consent. ROC navy forces rejected PRC forces' attempts to cut off ROC supply lines through amphibious landings. In response to the ROC's invocation of the 1954 mutual defence treaty, the United States sent in more naval, air, and artillery forces including the U.S. Seventh Fleet to defend the islands and keep supply lines open. The Soviet Union distanced itself and advised prudence after the crisis ended in a standoff. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis ended after a truce was reached in October 1958.[22]

As Sino-Soviet tensions increased, the PRC renewed its offensive in August 1958, unleashing a heavy artillery attack on Kinmen and Matsu without Soviet agreement. ROC naval forces turned down PRC forces' efforts to cut off ROC supply lines through amphibious landings. In response to the ROC's invocation of the 1954 mutual defence treaty, the United States sent in more naval, air, and artillery forces to the U.S. Seventh Fleet to defend the islands and keep supply lines open. The Soviet Union distanced themselves and advised prudence after the crisis ended in a standoff. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis ended after a truce was reached in October 1958.

USA military support under the Formosa Resolution

Passed in January 1955, the Formosa Resolution was a landmark piece of U.S. legislation pertaining to Taiwan, also known as Formosa. It was created when tensions between the US and Communist China grew during the Chinese Civil War, which forced Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime to evacuate to Taiwan. The resolution, which was part of a larger Cold War policy aimed at limiting communism in the Asia-Pacific region, allowed President Dwight D. Eisenhower to use military action to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands from armed assault.

This law was enacted due to heightened military pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which started intense artillery attacks on the ROC-held offshore islands of Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu in late 1954. The PRC aimed to dismantle these strategic positions prior to the establishment of a suggested Northeast Asian Treaty Organization (NEATO), potentially involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In December 1954, the United States and the Republic of China entered into the Sino-American Mutual Defense

[20] "Introduction | U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China." Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/task-force-report/us-taiwan-Relations-in-a-new-era/introduction.

[21] State.gov. (2019). The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958. [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises.

[22] U.S. Naval Institute. (2024). Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. [online] Available at: https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history/2024/december/crisis-taiwan-strait.

Treaty, permitting the U.S. to station military assets on and around ROC territory for joint defense. Both parties pledged to resist military aggression and communist undermining.

Increased military pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which launched intense artillery bombardment on the ROC-held offshore islands of Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu in late 1954, led to the adoption of this regulation. Before the proposed Northeast Asian Treaty Organisation (NEATO), which would have included the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, was established, the PRC sought to demolish these vital locations. The Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty, which was signed in December 1954, allowed the United States to place military equipment on and near ROC territory for mutual defence. Both sides vowed to oppose communist sabotage and military invasion.[23]

The Formosa Resolution received strong backing from the U.S. Congress, with substantial bipartisan majorities approving it in both the House and the Senate. It authorized President Eisenhower to protect Taiwan and its nearby islands "as he sees fit," although it did not clearly assure the defense of particular offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu, which were vital to both sides. The resolution established a precedent by allowing the president pre-approval to use U.S. forces overseas without an official war declaration.[24]

One China Policy

The United States' “One China” policy is frequently mistaken for the “One China” principle advocated by Beijing, which asserts that Taiwan is an inseparable component of China. The "One China", formally adopted in 1979, policy recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the official government of China.

The scope of the U.S. "One China" policy has significantly expanded since Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in the spring of 1979 .[25] By creating a legal structure that allowed the US to continue to have an "unofficial relationship" with the Taiwanese people through its American Institute in Taiwan, which serves as a de facto embassy, the Act facilitated the PRC's recognition.[26] It also made it possible for the United States to support Taiwan in the

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[23] “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II - Office of the Historian.” History.state.gov, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d56.

[24] Cqpress.com. (2025). Login | Sage Publications. [online] Available at: https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal71-1253311 #_=_

[25] Murray, Yvonne. “What Is the “One China Policy” and Why Does It Matter?” RTE.ie, 21 Jan. 2024, www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2024/0121/1427634-one-china-policy/, urn:epic:1427634.

[26] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Taiwan Relations Act, 1979," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/taiwan-relations-act

event of assault. Consequently, the policy applies to both China and Taiwan, and it is more accurate to call it a "cross-Strait policy."[27]

Throughout the years, three essential factors have influenced this policy

Reciprocal Compromises: Both Taiwan and China are encouraged to give in specific objectives to preserve their union with the United States. Taiwan's uncertain international standing and security guarantees were impacted when the United States failed to support its aim to be recognised as a distinct sovereign country from China. In contrast, China had to endure, albeit not wholeheartedly accept, the U.S.'s wide-ranging unofficial connections with Taiwan, such as arms sales and the demand for a peaceful conflict resolution factors China considers interference in its internal matters.

Equitable Benefits: Even with compromises, each party obtained adequate advantages to render their relation with the U.S. This symmetry has therefore enabled the United States to further its interests in the Taiwan Strait while preserving political influence with both parties.
Thus, referring to this strategy merely as the “One China” policy conceals its entirety and undermines its importance. It is more accurately a “cross-Strait approach” that has facilitated effective U.S. diplomacy in the area.

Dual Purpose: The policy's dual function allows a structure for interactions with the PRC and Taiwan and also tackles security issues. Considering China’s unwillingness to forgo the use of force regarding Taiwan and the U.S.’s dedication to maintaining its enduring relationship with Taiwan, the policy encompasses measures for a military reaction to any Chinese threat in the region. Simultaneously, it seeks to foster effective relations with China and Taiwan, protecting American interests by balancing obligations and preserving the trust.

An instance of this delicate balance took place under the presidency of Taiwanese leader Chen Shui-bian. In 2003, fears that Chen’s policies could disrupt the peaceful status quo prompted President George W. Bush to explicitly dismiss any unilateral alterations to the status quo while in the presence of the Chinese premier, highlighting the U.S. dedication to preserving stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The importance of the One China Policy in regard to China and Taiwan

The United States' "One China" policy includes official recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as China's only government by the US . Chinese strongly believe that Taiwan is a component of China, as affirmed by Beijing's "One China" policy . The policy additionally emphasizes on the expectation that cross strait conflicts shall be settled peacefully.

The United States however has suspended the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (ROC). Washington continues to refer to the status of Taiwan as “undetermined”, and does not acknowledge the island's current government as a sovereign state under the international system. Nevertheless, the U.S. reserves the right to provide Taiwan with arms to assist resist any use of force or coercion that could threaten the security or social

[27] Pletcher, Kenneth. “One-Child Policy.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2018, www.britannica.com/topic/one-child-policy.

and economic systems of the people on Taiwan. According to the policy the President and Congress would decide on action that would be taken in the event of any attack on the island.[28]

Together these elements create the basis of the United States' "One China" policy, which creates a balance between formal recognition of the PRC and a commitment to preserving informal ties and defensive assistance for Taiwan. This sensitive diplomatic framework seeks to enable a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait conflicts, while protecting American interests and regional stability.

1992 Consensus

In 1992representatives of the governments of Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) and mainland China (People's Republic of China, PRC) known as the "1992 Consensus". It suggested both parties acknowledge that there is only one China, but each party could have its own interpretation of what "China" stands for.

For Beijing, the "1992 Consensus" is crucial because it upholds the "One China Principle", which states that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is part of China, and the PRC is the only official government representing all of China. For this reason, Beijing expects Taiwan's leaders, including President Tsai Ing-wen, to explicitly accept the "1992 Consensus." Accepting it means Taiwan cannot declare itself an independent country separate from China. There is disagreement in Taiwan regarding the 1992 Consensus; the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) , the Taiwanese nationalist political party in Taiwan, currently the ruling party, rejects it as being incompatible with Taiwan's political reality and sovereignty, while the KMT supports it as a framework for handling cross-strait relations. Taiwan's internal political climate and cross-strait relations are heavily influenced by this split.

The 1992 consensus is often emphasized in Beijing's political speeches. An example would be, in the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2017, President Xi Jinping stated that the "1992 Consensus" represents the One-China principle and is the foundation of the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.

Recent military actions

China increasing military drills around Taiwan[29]

Since the Democratic Progressive party took office in 2016 under Tsai Ing-Wen, China's drills around the Island of Taiwan have increased. China has raised not only the frequency but also the scale and the complexity of its military drills, thereby representing Beijing's growing dissatisfaction with Taiwan's pro-independence stance and strategic goals.[30]

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[28] Goldstein, Steven M. "Understanding the One China Policy." Brookings, 31 Aug. 2023, www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/.

[29] ---. "China Launches Surprise Military Drills around Taiwan." The Guardian, The Guardian, Apr. 2025, China launches surprise military drills around Taiwan

[30] Global Taiwan Institute (2024). *China's Military Exercises Around Taiwan: Trends and Patterns | Global Taiwan Institute*. [online] Global Taiwan Institute. Available at:

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a unified organization of China’s land, sea, and air forces that is also one of the largest military forces in the world. So in order to start conducting frequent, extensive, and highly skilled operations in 2018 instead of only conducting infrequent drills, the People's Republic of China has utilized PLA. In addition to the exercises involving the PLA’s Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force, China has increasingly included non-military organizations like the China Coast Guard and maritime militia. Therefore enhancing China's capacity to maintain control in both peacetime and conflict.

Notable examples of operations that were conducted by the PLA took place in August of 2022 and 2023. Following the visit by the then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in 2022, there was a noticeable increase in massive drills organized by the PLA Eastern Theatre Command. The Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, and Logistic Support Force were some of the branches of the PLA that took part in the drills. In August of 2023, after Taiwan’s Vice President Lai Ching-te visited the United States, the PLA conducted similar exercises around Taiwan .

The 2022 exercises featured Chinese aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, as well as amphibious assault ships, advanced destroyers, and fighter jets such as the J-20 and J-16. By May 2024, China had deployed over 100 aircraft and nearly 50 naval vessels near Taiwan, with numerous PLA aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line—some approaching Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone for the first time. These operations also highlight advances in military technology, including drones, cyber warfare capabilities, and precision ballistic missiles, signaling a shift toward modern, multi-domain warfare.

The PLA's military operations are closely linked to political events that Beijing considers inflammatory, such as foreign dignitaries' visits or remarks made by Taiwan's government. For example, the PLA increased its drills after President Lai Ing-wen's inauguration in May 2024, when she demanded a halt to Beijing's intimidation. Both the population and government of Taiwan are intimidated by these actions. In addition to that, these drills demonstrate China’s military capability to the international community, specifically the United States and Japan.
By carrying out several joint combat preparedness patrols, including the "Strait Thunder-2025A" live-fire exercise in the East China Sea, the PLA further increased its presence in the early months of 2025. Coordinated attacks on fictitious important targets, maritime blockades, and patrols by Coast Guard and military vessels were all part of these activities. PLA aviation missions into Taiwan's aviation Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) have more than doubled since President Lai took office, putting increased military pressure on Taiwan's defence forces and increasing the possibility of a miscalculation.

Hybrid tactics: cyberattacks, disinformation

Since Tsai Ing-Wen assumed office in 2016, Beijing's strategy to undermine Taiwan’s democratically elected government, which is referred to as "separatist” by Beijing, is underlined

by Hybrid warfare.[31] The term "hybrid warfare" refers to the combination of both conventional and unconventional means of subversion and force[32]. This campaign can be divided into two main stages as both include Tsai's presidential terms. The first part is running from 2016 to 2020, which includes Tsai's first presidential term, while the second extends from 2020 to the close of 2023, covering her second term. During Tsai's first term, China mostly employed active tactics, with dynamic actions playing a supporting role. Throughout this period, Beijing's hybrid methods heavily relied on diplomatic pressure by pressuring Taipei's diplomatic allies to switch their recognition to Beijing, China sought to lower Taiwan's standing in the world. Hence, several countries such as São Tomé and Príncipe, Panama, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati terminated their diplomatic relationships with Taiwan to pursue connections with China.

China's hybrid strategy includes widespread propaganda and disinformation campaigns, with two primary objectives. Firstly, China aims to weaken trust in the Tsai Ing-wen-led government. Additionally, it intends to promote a positive view of mainland China among the Taiwanese population. Beijing's physiological operations consist, however, of three primary elements: state-run media outlets like People's Daily, China Daily, Global Times, Xinhua, and CCTV; Taiwanese media sources that align with Beijing's perspectives; and social media networks, where Chinese trolls and inauthentic accounts aim to sway public sentiment.

Another crucial element of China's hybrid strategy has been cyberwarfare. Significant attacks targeting Taiwanese military and government websites have been carried out by cyber attackers under Chinese authority. Taiwan News claims that more than 200 million cyberattacks from China were launched against Taiwan's military websites in 2017 alone. The Ministry of National Defence, the National Defence University, the National Armed Forces Recruitment Centre, the Medical Affairs Bureau's affiliated medical institutions, and the Political Warfare Bureau were among the most targeted networks. According to a June 2018 Financial Times story, there has been an increase in significant cyberattacks against Taiwan over the previous two years, highlighting Beijing's mounting pressure as the US reiterates its support for the autonomous island.

Grey zones

In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly demonstrated a tendency to engage in "gray zone" (huise didai 灰色地帶) activities against the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Gray zone tactics involve coercive actions that are non-military and surpass typical diplomatic, economic, and security strategies while remaining beneath the level of war. Under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PRC has intensified its deployment of gray zone strategies against Taiwan to alter the power

[31] ---. "China Launches Surprise Military Drills around Taiwan." The Guardian, The Guardian, Apr. 2025, www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/01/china-launches-surprise-military-drills-around-taiwan.

[32] Bilal, Arsalan. "Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and "Trust" as the Antidote." NATO Review, 30 Nov. 2021, www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html

dynamics of the conflict and secure strategic benefits either to persuade Taipei that it needs to swiftly "reunify" with the mainland or to facilitate a potential PRC conflict with the island. Gray zone activities represent one of the seven fundamental components of CCP political warfare alongside information manipulation, "lawfare," economic pressure, united front efforts, espionage, and cyber actions and aim to strengthen the others by undermining Taiwan's territorial sovereignty, depleting its military and law enforcement capabilities, and diminishing the sense of security among its population.[33]

On July 9 2025, Taiwan began its yearly “Han Guang” military drills, representing the biggest and longest version to date, lasting around ten days—twice as long as last year’s exercises. For the first time, these exercises officially incorporated grey zone tactics as a main priority alongside traditional defense scenarios. Grey zone strategies, which have expanded in range and complexity over the last ten years, consist of unclear and intimidating measures that do not escalate to outright conflict. They are intended to take advantage of systemic weaknesses and focus on particular actors or institutions, making them hard to combat.The People’s Republic of China (PRC) persists in stressing "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan, yet its ongoing application of grey zone tactics may be establishing the foundation for a possible military invasion in the future. These strategies involve intimidation by Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia ships around Taiwan’s offshore islands, cyberattacks, misinformation efforts, and various methods of pressure that refrain from direct military engagement.[34]

Taiwan's defense ministry announced that the Han kuang exercises commenced with training focused on addressing these grey zone operations, which involve measures to counteract Chinese maritime intimidation and strengthen critical ports and possible landing sites. The exercises included mock anti-landing maneuvers and assessed the island’s capacity to react to unexpected assaults on its military leadership and facilities. Around 22,000 reservists took part—marking a 50% rise from the previous year—together with regular troops, utilizing new armaments like U.S.-provided HIMARS rocket systems, homegrown missiles, drones, and sophisticated air defense systems. Alongside military exercises, the training included urban resilience components, such as evacuation drills in supermarkets during air raids and the implementation of mobile applications for coordinating emergency responses. These extensive exercises demonstrate Taiwan's commitment to improving its defense preparedness in response to the changing landscape of Chinese threats, especially those that obscure the distinction between peace and conflict.[35]

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[33] Grossman, Derek. “The Chinese Communist Party’s Gray Zone Tactics against Taiwan.” Rand.org, Global Taiwan Institute, 14 Mar. 2025, www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP70899.html.

[34] Kardon, Isaac. “Combating the Gray Zone: Examining Chinese Threats to the Maritime Domain.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 June 2024, carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/06/combating-the-gray-zone-examining-chinese-threats-to-t he-maritime-domain?lang=en.

[35] Lee, Yimou. “Taiwan Launches Biggest War Games with Simulated Attacks against Military Command.” Reuters, 9 July 2025, www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwan-launches-annual-war-games-with-simulat ed-attacks-against-military-command-2025-07-09/.

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

United States of America

The US as Taiwan's Key Security Partner

After ending its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 the United States decided to pass the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) , thus securing a continuing relationship. Even without formal diplomatic recognition, under this law, the United States was obligated to supply the island with defense supplies and resources essential to maintain a respectable capacity for self-defense. By providing Taiwan with military hardware, sustaining secure unofficial ties through the American Institute in Taiwan (which functions like an embassy), the United States has shown its commitment to the TRA over the years. Additionally, as the US has openly confirmed, the use of force or oppression against the island will be considered a threat for regional peace and stability. The TRA effectively delivers the idea that the US would strongly oppose any aggressive attempts by third parties to use force to alter Taiwan's status, although it isn't an official security treaty. In conclusion, the US presence and support to Taiwan have contributed to Taiwan's security reinforcement and the stability of the broader Asia-Pacific region.[36]

The US Supporting Taiwan's Military Modernization

As the US became Taiwan's key security partner and the principal provider of military equipment there have been several efforts to modernize Taiwan's defense forces. With the increasing military drills posed by China, Taiwan is more determined than ever to reach military modernization. Since the 1950s the United States has provided Taiwan with military aid and defence services with a total value of around $50 billion.Some of these include modern command-and-control infrastructure, refurbished naval vessels, missile systems, and advanced fighter planes. Additionally the United States has supported Taiwan's aim through joint training exercises, military technology transfers, and consulting services.

Following some policy reforms the United States have also increased their financial aid to Taiwan, especially during the last years.Notably, Congress has given Taiwan permission to accept direct military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which is often given to allies in need of urgent security support. [37]

Japan

Japan's 2025 Diplomatic Bluebook underlines the importance of fostering peace across the Taiwan Strait as a matter of both regional and global security. Since Japan has a crucial part in the Taiwan Strait issue, it vehemently rejects any such proposals which are violent or coerced that seek to alter the status quo.Although Japan preserves a vague public stance on Taiwan's

[36] Lev Nachman, Shelley Rigger, et al. "Why Does the US Security Partnership with Taiwan Matter?" Brookings, 26 Sept. 2024, www.brookings.edu/articles/why-does-the-us-security-partnership-with-taiwan-matter/.

[37] Masters, Jonathan, and Will Merrow. "U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts." Council on Foreign Relations, 29 Sept. 2024, www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts.

status, to prevent any rising tensions with China, it cooperates with the US and other regional allies to advocate for an open and free Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, Japan advocates for the passage of naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait, an activity that China strongly disapproves of, and maintains sea-borne freedom of navigation in the area. However, the presence of certain political and constitutional restrictions has resulted in Japan not providing military support or selling arms to Taiwan. The country's decision to prioritize building up informal contacts while still giving encouragement to the settlement of disputes through peaceful means.[38]

France

In its response to the increasing tension in Taiwan Strait, France has applied a rather measured and restrained approach since it aims to maintain a critical balance between its commitment to the One China policy while simultaneously supporting and promoting regional security and peace. Although France does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, changing the current status of the region by using the force is not accepted by France.
Additionally, for the first time, the French parliament has included Taiwan in a law when the two houses of the French parliament have successfully taken action in order to include safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait in the LPM, marking France as the first major country to adopt and enact legislation calling for the defense of freedom of navigation in Taiwan strait [39]

Playing the role of an independent actor on the global stage, France aims to champion the freedom of navigation while demanding the adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, France has the intention to join alliances in the China-US dispute over Taiwan since it's been made clear that multilateral cooperation, strategic autonomy and diplomacy are France's favorite approach. Moreover France advocates for regional security by acting responsibly based on international law, rather than joining the military camp, as it participates in joint naval operations and carries out diplomatic activities.[40]

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

DATE	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

[38] "Japan Foreign Policy Report Calls for Peace in Taiwan Strait: Taiwan News: Apr. 9, 2025 18:04." Taiwan News | Apr. 9, 2025 18:04, 9 Apr. 2025, taiwannews.com.tw/news/6080837.

[39] "MinistryofForeignAffairs,RepublicofChina(Taiwan)." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, Data Source：Department of European Affairs, 4 Aug. 2023, en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&sms=272&s=115201. Accessed 13 Aug. 2025.

[40] Masters, Jonathan, and Will Merrow. "U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts." Council on Foreign Relations, 29 Sept. 2024, www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts.

1894-1895	First Sino-Japanese War fought between Qing China and Japan, resulting in the Japanese victory
Post World War II (after 1945)	Japans surrounded and returned control of the territory it had acquired from China in 1895.
1945-1947	General George C.Marshall's Mission to China
January 1946	Ceasefire Announcement
1949	Chinese Civil War brought out in Mainland China between nationalist forces and the Communist Party.
October 1, 1949	Creation of the People's Republic of China
December 7 1949	Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China (ROC) government flee to Taiwan
1949	Status quo
August 8, 1954	The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established
September 3, 1954	First Taiwan Strait Crisis
December 1, 1954	Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and ROC
1955	Formosa Resolution
August 23,1958	Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

1971	United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, transferring China's UN seat from the ROC to the PRC
1979	One China Policy
1992	Consensus
2016	DPP under Tsai Ing-wen takes office; China begins increasing hybrid warfare tactics against Taiwan
August 2022	PLA conducts large-scale military drills around Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit.
August 2023	PLA military exercises intensify after Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te visits the U.S.
May 2024	PLA deploys over 100 aircraft and nearly 50 naval vessels near Taiwan; military drills increase in sophistication and frequency.
July 9, 2025	Taiwan launches its largest-ever "Han Guang" military exercises, formally incorporating grey zone tactics alongside conventional defense.
2020s	Increasing military drills, Hybrid attacks from China on Taiwan and reunification emphasis.
2025	Increasing military drills around the island of Taiwan by the PLA

RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES, AND EVENTS

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1950)
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf

On October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was acknowledged as the

only legitimate representative of China at the United Nations when UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 was adopted, removing Chiang Kai-shek's representatives from all UN agencies and related entities. During that period, Taiwan served as the base for the Republic of China. This resolution addressed the matter of China's representation in the UN by transferring

the "Chinese seat" from the Republic of China to the PRC, which ruled mainland China.

Nonetheless, Beijing has often misrepresented the significance of UNGA Resolution 2758 to advocate for its One China Principle. This principle states that there exists only one China, that Taiwan is an integral part of the Chinese land, and that the PRC is the only rightful government representing all of China. In the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing aimed to globalize this principle by merging it with the One China Policies of various nations, which usually recognize but do not entirely embrace the principle. Since 2022, Beijing has regularly asserted that the One China Principle "was explicitly acknowledged by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971" and that it embodies "a global consensus of the international community and a fundamental norm in international relations."

These distortions undermine legal clarity regarding current and potential future Chinese aggression across the Taiwan Strait, threatening the status quo as well as regional peace and stability. Furthermore, Taiwan's exclusion from participation in the UN and other international bodies hampers global cooperation on critical issues such as public health, climate change, and the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.[41]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 87 (1950)

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112030?ln=en&v=pdf

United Nations Security Council Resolution 87, passed on September 29, 1950, dealt with the circumstances resulting from the People's Republic of China's (PRC) announcement of a military invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). The resolution acknowledged the Security Council's responsibility to examine any circumstances that could result in international tension or endanger global peace and security. It acknowledged the PRC's statement and, amid differing views in the Council about China's representation, chose to postpone discussion of the issue until after November 15, 1950. Additionally, the Council welcomed a representative from the PRC to engage in talks on the matter after that date, permitting representatives from both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) to attend the discussions. This resolution was passed with seven votes in favor, three opposed (which included the ROC, Cuba, and the United States), and one abstention (Egypt). This resolution arose from the continued contention regarding which government rightfully represented China in the United Nations, as the PRC had recently taken control of mainland China and aimed to displace the ROC in the UN.[42]

[41] "UNGA Resolution 2758 Factsheet: What You Need to Know." Ipac.global, 2024, www.ipac.global/campaigns/unra-resolution-2758-factsheet-what-you-need-to-know.

[42] "Security Council Resolution 87 (1950) [Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)] | Refworld." Refworld, 2023, www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/1950/en/72639 .

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

Military Deterrence and Alliances

US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (1954-1955)

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 87 in 1950 after a series of conflicts that year, specifically the military assault on Taiwan, Formosa, by the People's Republic of China (PRC). This resolution emphasized the growing concern about the conflict's tendency to worsen by recognizing the complaint of military aggression and urging for an end to the conflict. The US-Roc Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1954 between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) and became effective in 1955. This treaty was formed as a reaction to the consistent danger presented by the PRC and its objective was to bind the United States to protect Taiwan from any attacks. In fact, the treaty became a vital factor in military deterrence throughout the Cold War period. Thus it would preserve regional stability as it aimed at blocking the PRC military progress toward Taiwan. The US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty played a crucial role in strengthening the US commitment to Taiwan defense, successfully preventing large-scale military aggression by the PRC for many years. The agreement however was dissolved in 1979 since the US shifted its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC) thereby representing a dramatic change in Taiwan's approach to foreign security.

Worth mentioning is the creation of a defensive security assurance from the US, which was the main benefit of the ROC. The assurance from the US greatly intimidated extensive military conflict regarding Taiwan. The agreement additionally supported regional stability in a turbulent time, during the Cold War strains, developing Taiwan’s defense and assuring its citizens and allies of US commitment and dedication.

Nonetheless, the agreement also resulted in some adverse effects. It solidified Taiwan as a central point in US-China competition, likely increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait instead of addressing the fundamental political conflict. Moreover, dependence on this agreement led to a security reliance that turned problematic when the United States changed recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979 and later ended the treaty. This change made Taiwan more isolated and defenseless, highlighting the shortcomings of military alliances in ensuring long-term security without simultaneous diplomatic resolutions.[43]

Investments in Defense

Investment in defense has been a crucial element for both Taiwan and the United States in strengthening deterrence and preparing for a potential conflict around the island. With the United States' continued investment in long-range precision-guided bombs, underwater warfare capabilities, and the creation of more basing access in the Indo-Pacific, the operational flexibility and survivability would improve. Additionally, to strengthen collective defense capability, strong regional allies like Japan and Australia should be included in operational planning. Taiwan should also invest in asymmetric, robust, and attainable capabilities that would make any PRC

[43] Office of the Historian. “The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958.” State.gov, 2019, history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises.

invasion attempt more complex. This includes improving active and reserve force training, stockpiling key weapons and supplies, and developing capabilities for unconventional warfare. Therefore, investment in defense is essential in order to be able to sustain a much longer conflict rather than just preventing an assault immediately.[44]

Challenges and Limitations

Escalatory Spiral

In Michael D. Swaine's "Paths to Crisis and Conflict over Taiwan," he covers the "Escalatory Spiral", describing the significant challenges and limitations in handling possible crises between the United States and China over Taiwan. Absence of effective crisis communication channels between the US, China, and Taiwan means that even small events like military drills or visits by high-level politicians can be misinterpreted and result in rapidly escalating tensions. Leaders in politics might have difficulties in calming down the situation without being perceived as weak or losing their credibility among their supporters, after having made public declarations or threats. This situation will still occur even if the parties are not looking for war intentionally along the way because of the "commitment trap," which is the condition that makes conflict more probable due to the need to keep up the political facade of not changing the decision.[45]

Evolving PRC Posture

Under "Evolving PRC Posture," the rapidly expanding Chinese military capabilities and increasingly belligerent regional activities are at the heart of the challenges and constraints in the cross-strait conflict.Apartfrom expanding its cyber and space capabilitiesand incorporating advanced technologies like artificialintelligence inits weaponry, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has considerably increased its capability for "joint long-range precision strikes." In an attempt to challenge the status quo, China repeatedly sends military aircraft into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone and has expanded its cyberattacks and gray-zone maneuvers.

Existing implicit understandings, like the median line in the Taiwan Strait, have been effectively undermined by such actions, leaving the prospect of misperception and inadvertent escalation. China's willingness to resort to economic sanctions, hold massive military maneuvers, and defy established diplomatic and commercial practices increases the complexity of its role. Both Taiwan and its allies are faced with difficult, ambiguous, andmulti-faceted challenges as a result of the scale and nature of PRC activities, frequently triggered by perceived difficulties or international interaction with Taiwan. These trends highlight deficiencies in existing frameworks of crisis prevention and communication among affected parties, making crisis management, de-escalation,and regional stability maintenance far more difficult. Finally,

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[44] Pettyjohn, Stacie , et al. "Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan." Www.cnas.org, 15 June 2022, www.cnas.org/publications/reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans.

[45] Swaine, Michael D. "Paths to Crisis and Conflict over Taiwan." Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 8 Mar. 2024, quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-conflict-over-taiwan/#growing-risk-of-conflict-in-the-t aiwan-strait.

the PRC's changing stand increases the chances of an all-out war, driven by purpose but also by a higher chance of unintended escalation as a result of the speed and nuance of recent moves.[46]

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Strengthening Taiwan's Defense and Resilience

Military Modernization and "Porcupine Strategy"

Since China has increased its military activity near the Island of Taiwan, Taiwan's Foreign Minister Lin Chai-lung, stated on July 19, 2024, that the country will mainly depend on its resources for national defense. The then presidential candidate Donald Trump encouraged the proposal of Taiwan financing the US defense in exchange for security. It is of great importance to mention that Lin Chai-lung had also addressed the matter. The Foreign Minister noted that, unlike South Korea or Japan, Taiwan doesn't have an official defense agreement with the US, regardless that the US is Taiwan's main military partner and is legally required (under the Taiwan Relations Act) to support its defense.

It is without a doubt that Taiwan's expenses have increased from 2% to 2.5% over the past eight years. Broader military reforms include the investment on domestic capabilities, such developing submarines and strengthening unmanned systems, and extending the time for conscription. Thus Taiwan's expenses are expected to increase even more.

Taipei's "Porcupine Strategy," supported by both U.S. administrations and Taiwan's leadership, aims to complicate invasion efforts by obtaining mobile, resilient, and affordable asymmetrical weapon systems that can withstand and slow down a larger enemy's first strike. This approach, strongly advocated since 2016 by the governing Democratic Progressive Party, is intended to boost deterrence by increasing the possible costs of hostile actions for China. Lin noted the importance of maintaining national unity and being cautious, adding that while Taiwan should keep track of Beijing's long-term military objectives (such as the ambition to have a world-class military by 2049), it shouldn't be constrained by them.[47]

Assessment of Taiwan's International Engagement and Defence Strategy

Taiwan's defense strategy, known as the "Porcupine Strategy," is a common method of asymmetric warfare that aims to deter Chinese aggression by making an invasion extremely costly. This approach is expected to prioritize low-cost assets such as drones, cyber defense, mobility, etc. With expanded recruitment and domestic weapons production while

[46] Center for Preventive Action. "Confrontation over Taiwan." Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 July 2024, www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan.

[47] Blanchard, Ben. "Taiwan Must Rely on Itself for Defence, Foreign Minister Responds to Trump." Reuters, 19 July 2024, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-must-rely-itself-defence-foreign-minister-says-2024-0 7-19/.

simultaneously maintaining public support Taiwan's resilience will be reinforced. However, it demands sustained defence investment, political will, and the inclusion of innovative technologies.

Implementation and International Support

Implementation includes combining innovative technology with external help and growing Taiwan's domestic defence industry, a number of member states have also provided Taiwan with both direct and indirect foreign help. As Taiwan's key security partner the United States provides strategic support, military aid, and training imposed by the Taiwan Relations Act and therefore plays a crucial role in the matter. As a regional allie of the U.S. Japan and Australia provide indirect support to Taiwan through their involvement in the Quad alliance[48]. EU member states who show concerncross-strait stability about, lastly, are known for providing Taiwan with diplomatic or economic aid in alternative to military support.

Civilian Preparedness

Through a "whole-of-society" strategy incorporating efforts from the public, business, and civil society sectors, Taiwan has improved its social resilience. In 2024, the Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee will be established with the goal of coordinating and standardising civil defence initiatives throughout Taiwan. Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee civilian force training, strategic material preparation, critical supply distribution, energy and infrastructure maintenance, social welfare, medical care, evacuation readiness, and financial network protection. First aid, media literacy, open-source intelligence, and disaster response to civilians training programs are provided by private organisations such as Kuma Academy and the Forward Alliance.[49]

Cybersecurity

To enhance cybersecurity, Taiwan is creating cloud-based, off-island systems to replicate essential functions and government operations. The creation of an immediate team of cybersecurity experts and collaborations with leading private-sector cybersecurity companies are undertaken. Low earth orbit communication satellites are seen as alternatives for undersea cables and Taiwan's active participation in the U.S. Cyber Command's Hunt Forward[50]. The program is all part of Taiwan's strategy to bolster its cybersecurity resilience.

Diplomatic and International Engagement

Constructive Dialogue

Constructive Dialogue is seen as a key element that could help in the resolution of the

[48] Rathi, Rishab. "Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?" Thediplomat.com, The Diplomat, 16 July 2025, thediplomat.com/2025/07/can-the-quad-hold-the-line-on-taiwan/.

[49] "About the Committee-Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee-Policy Vision | Office of the President Republic of China(Taiwan)." Office of the President Republic of China(Taiwan), 2024, english.president.gov.tw/Page/670.

[50] "News." Cybercom.mil, 2023, www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Tag/182880/hunt-forward

escalating tension in the Taiwan Strait, by indulging in positive dialogue China and Taiwan will be able to limit and avert escalations in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has also been advised to develop diplomatic channels that will ensure debate and negotiation, even in critical circumstances. Thereby a resolution of the matter can be secured and minimise the chance of unintentional military conflicts. Additionally, through further interaction with international allies that share similar views on regional stability, Taiwan is able to reinforce its diplomacy. Thus Taiwan's influence in diplomatic engagement with China has increased. By emphasizing on transparency and trust-enhancement, the likelihood of fostering a stable and trustworthy environment with China and other regional actors is increased. [51]

Crisis Management Mechanisms

Michael D. Swaine, a renowned American political scientist, strongly believes that crisis management of the United States and China is insufficient thus also unable to settle the presumed dispute over the Island of Taiwan . Swaine emphasises that military-to-military hotlines are ineffective and fail to effectively control the complex nature of the issues at hand. He advocated for the creation of a more comprehensive and stable crisis management framework that will combine both military and civilian, thus reducing the likelihood of escalation and increasing understanding between the two parties.[52]

Strengthening Alliances

By creating solid partnerships with regional countries who share similar democratic values in order to counter external influences and advance Taiwan's interests overseas. Thus Taiwan has enhanced its global partnership and improved its international standing and safety.

Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), a training program established in 2015, represents Taiwan’s dedication for international cooperation. The program collaborates with the United States and its regional allies like Japan and Australia, and thereby offers a venue for Taiwan to engage and enhance its diplomatic participation. During the Covid-19 Pandemic Japan and Taiwan managed to engage in scientific research, and mutual aid and trade agreements. Taiwan's diplomatic ties with the European Union has supported the improvement of varied sectors such as human rights, digital transformation, new technologies, and green energy. Additionally the GCFT provides training programs in various fields such as

[51] Belo , Dani , and David Carment. “Taiwan’s Deterrence Equation: Calculating Gray Zone Strategies to Address China’s Assertiveness.” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, June 2024, www.cgai.ca/taiwans_deterrence_equation_calculating_gray_zone_strategies_to_address_chinas_asserti veness.

[52] Swaine, Michael D. “Paths to Crisis and Conflict over Taiwan.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 8 Mar. 2024, quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-conflict-over-taiwan/#growing-risk-of-conflict-in-the-taiwan-stra it.

public health, law enforcement, cybersecurity, energy security, media literacy, women's empowerment, humanitarian help, and disaster relief.[53]

Addressing "Gray-Zone" Threats

Countering Subversion and Disinformation

Influence and disinformation campaigns along with sabotage are mean components of the advanced gray zone tactics China has been applying against Taiwan. These tactics aim at jeopardizing Taiwan's democratic system and public trust, in order to counter these threats Taiwan has strengthened its resilience by developing information security, improving media literacy and raising public awareness. Furthermore, initiatives for strategic communication are crucial to defending democratic values and thwarting disinformation. In addition to that Taiwan's defense against these non-military tactics can be strengthened through cooperation with international allies, including intelligence sharing and joint initiativesBy merging government programs with corporate sector and civil society efforts, Taiwan is building a comprehensive, whole-of-society method to identify and combat misinformation before it spreads, ensuring coordinated, timely, and resilient responses to information threats.[54]

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[54] Byman, Daniel, and Seth G Jones. "How to Toughen up Taiwan." Foreign Affairs, 15 Mar. 2025, www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-toughen-taiwan. Accessed 4 July 2025.

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